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ARTICLES
Law in a Shrinking World:
The Interaction of Science and
Technology with International Law
BY JOSEPH W DELLAPENNA*
Law is bound by its form.'
INTRODUCTION
A t least since the rediscovering of Roman law in eleventh-
AA century Italy, Western legal theory has been suffused with the
I-Lknotion that law is eternal and unchangmg---"rIght reason" as
Coke expressed it.2 Ever since Oliver Wendell Holmes taught us that "law
*Professor of Law, VillanovaUniversity. B.B.A. 1965,University of Michigan;
J.D. 1968, Detroit College of Law; LL.M. 1969 (Public International &
Comparative Law), George Washington University; LL.M. 1974 (Environmental
Law), Columbia University. Earlier versions ofthis Article were delivered at ajoint
conference of the American Society of International Law and the Chinese Society
of International Law in Beijing and at an Association of American Law Schools
Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.
I Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV 509,
509 (1992).
2 EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE (16th ed. 1809) (1628). See also EMERICH
DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (Joseph
Chitty ed., 1883) (1763); HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 16
(A.C. Campbell ed., 1901) (1682); THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A
PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 54-55 (J.
Cropsey ed., 1971) (1681). See generally RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS
THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1979); Harold J. Berman, The
Origins of Histortcal Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651
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is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky," it has been nearly impossible
to think of law as expressing logical truths or eternal verities. The life of
the law really has been, as Holmes insisted on several occasions, expen-
ence, not logic.4 No wonder Holmes concluded that "a page of history is
worth a volume of logic."' The problem that Holmes' insight leaves us is
to relate law to contemporary experience in a world in which social reality
changes at electromc speed.
One can hardly pick up a report on current legal developments without
finding references to the dramatic challenges posed to law, lawyers, and
legal systems by emerging technologies.6 These changes include genetic
(1994); Allen Dillard Boyer, "Understanding, Authority, and Will" Sir Edward
Coke and the Elizabethan Origins ofJudicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REv 43 (1997);
Howard Schweber, The "Science " of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural
Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW &HIST. REV
421 (1999).
3 Southern Pac. Co. v Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
4 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 1963) (1944); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARV L. REV 457, 469 (1897).
1 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
6 See Jennifer L. Alvey, Coming Soon to a Web Site Near You: Europe's Data
Privacy Protection Policy, 68 U.S.L.W 2334 (Dec. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Coming
Soon]; Jennifer L. Alvey & David Kaut, Congress Mulls Over E-Commerce
Measures on Database Protections, Consumer Privacy, 68 U.S.L.W 2475 (Feb.
15, 2000); Charles Bogmo, Government Agencies, Private Sector Find Ways to
Target Fraud Schemes on Internet, 68 U.S.L.W 2336 (Dec. 7, 1999) [hereinafter
Bogmo, FraudSchemes]; Charles Bogmo, NCCUSL Electromc Signature Measure
Finds Solid Support in Maryland, Virginia, Nebraska, 68 U.S.L.W 2486 (Feb. 22,
2000); Barry L. Brickner, Scary Things (OrHowtoAvoldBreachingEthics on the
Internet),78 MICH.B.J. 578 (June 1999); Clinton Signs Measure to RaiseDamages
by 50 Percent for Copyright Infringement, 68 U.S.L.W 2360 (Dec. 21, 1999)
(reporting the signing of the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages
ImprovementAct); CommercePanel Approves E-Signature Bill Seen as Overbroad
by Administration, States, 68 U.S.L.W 2083 (Aug. 17, 1999); Congress Gets Bill
to Continue Ban on New State Taxes on Internet Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2000, atA20; Joyce E. Cutter, Police FightAgainstInternet Crime ShouldInvolve
Consumers, Industry, 68 U.S.L.W 2415 (Jan. 18, 2000); Distance Education
Conference, 30 SYLLABUS, Fall 1999; Electronic Signature Bill Fails in House;
Democrats Fume that Measure Was Rushed, 68 U.S.L.W 2265 (Nov 9, 1999);
FDA Warns Foreign Online Drug Sites that Sales to United States May Be Illegal,
68 U.S.L.W 2473 (Feb. 15, 2000) [hereinafter FDA Warns]; FDIC Offers
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engineering and other developments affectingthe beginning of human life,7
Guidance on Identity Theft Act; FTCAmends Rules to Implements [sic] New Law,
68 U.S.L.W 2265 (Nov. 9, 1999); Mark Felsenthal, Clinton Opposes Internet
Access Taxes, Seeks 'Balance' on State Sales Taxes, 68 U.S.L.W 2487 (Feb. 22,
2000); Neil Hare, House CommerceApproves Database Bill; Concerns overLegal
Publishing Put on Hold, 68 U.S.L.W 2083 (Aug. 17, 1999); ICANNAccredits
WIPO to Provide Cybersquatting Dispute Resolution Services, 68 U.S.L.W 2333
(Dec. 7, 1999) [hereinafter ICANN Accredits WIPO]; Lorraine McCarthy,
Pennsylvania is First State to Adopt NCCUSL's Uniform E-Signature Law, 68
U.S.L.W 2358 (Dec. 21, 1999); Susan 1. McGolnck, Electronic Communication
Raises Issues overRights of Workers, Unions, Employers, 68 U.S.L.W. 2488 (Feb.
22, 2000); James E. Morgan, Keeping Company Secrets off the Internet, LITIG.
NEWS, Jan. 2000, at 4; NCCUSL Gives Final Approval to Model Laws on
Electronic Signatures, Software Licenses, 68 U.S.L.W 2069 (Aug. 10, 1999);
OECD Issues International Guidelines for Consumer Protection in E-Commerce,
68 U.S.L.W 2358 (Dec. 21, 1999) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]; William G.
Paul, E-Lawyering 2000, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2000, at 6; Pyramid Schemes, High-Tech
Scams Said to Flourish in Fertile Internet Soil, 68 U.S.L.W 2415 (Jan. 18, 2000)
[hereinafter Pyramid Schemes]; Hope Viner Sambom, Client on Line 1--and
Online, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at 79; Sentencing Guidelines Are Proposedfor 'No
Electronic ThefiAct' Offenses, 68 U.S.L.W. 2407 (Jan. 18,2000); Lawrence Speer,
Online Banking, Growing Sophistication of Criminals Said to Pose Ongoing
Womes, 68 U.S.L.W 2471 (Feb. 15, 2000); Ralph A. Taylor, Jr., Lawyers May
Use E-Mailfor Client Confidence: Reasonable to Expect Privacy for All Forms of
E-Mail, ABA Ethics Committee Says, LITIG. NEWS, July 1999, at 3; Margaret
Graham Tebo, Filling "E-Carts 'with Caution: Business Law Section Helps Online
Shoppers Avoid Problems, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2000, at 89; US., EU Will Not Sign Data
Privacy Deal at Upcoming Summit Meeting, Official Says, 68 U.S.L.W. 2339 (Dec.
14, 1999) [hereinafter U.S., EU Will Not Sign]; Brian D. Wassom, A Reasonable
Expectation ofPnvacy: Can Michigan Attorneys Safely Use Unencrypted Internet
E-Mail for Confidential Communications?, 78 MICH. B.J. 590 (June 1999);
Witnesses Spar over ADA "s Applicability to Internet Web Sites During House
Hearing, 68 U.S.L.W 2485 (Feb. 22,2000); see also Proceedings of the Canada-
United States Law Institute Conference: The Impact of Technological Change in
the Canada/U.S. Context, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 1 (1999).
7 See RENEE R. ANSPACH, DECIDING WHO LIVES: FATEFUL CHOICES IN THE
INTENSIVE-CARENURSERY (1993); ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY (Lon B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994); ROBERT BLANK
& JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND
CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1995); WALTER BODMER & ROBIN MCKIE, THE BOOK OF
MAN: THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE QUEST TO DISCOVER OUR GENETIC
HERITAGE (1994); JUDITH A. BOSS, THE BIRTH LOTTERY: PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS
AND SELECTIVE ABORTION (1993); MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL, LAW, ETHICS AND
1999-2000]
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REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE (1994); ARTHUR CAPLAN, DUE CONSIDERATION:
CONTROVERSY IN THE AGE OF MEDICAL MIRACLES (1997); THE CENTER FOR
BIOETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY PRESENTS GENETIC ETHICS: DO THE ENDS
JUSTIFY THE GENES? (John F Kilner et al. eds., 1997); CLONING (Paul A. Winters
ed., 1998); CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (1997); THE CODE OF CODES:
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES INTHE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Daniel J. Kevles
& Leroy Hood eds., 1992); COMPELLED COMPASSION: GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION IN THE TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL NEWBORNS (Arthur L.
Caplan et al. eds., 1992); CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS (Tom L.
Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 2d ed. 1982) (1978); ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN,
THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE HUMAN GENOME (1994); LYNDA
BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY
(1998); GERM-LINE INTERVENTION AND OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS (Emmanuel Agius et al. eds., 1998); RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH
WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: How GENETIC INFORMATION IS PRODUCED
AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS, INSURANCE
COMPANIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS (1993); HUMAN CLONING (James
M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 1998); THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND
THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE (Thomas H. Murray et al. eds., 1996); JUSTICE AND
THE HUMAN GENOMEPROJECT (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lapp6 eds., 1994);
JEROME KAGAN, THREE SEDUCTIVE IDEAS (1998); LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q.
WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING (1998); ANDREW KIMBRELL, THE
HUMAN BODY SHOP- THE ENGINEERING AND MARKETING OF LIFE (1993); PHILIP
KITCHER, THE LIVES TO COME: THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN
POSSIBILITIES (1996); GINAKOLATA, CLONE: THEROADTO DOLLY, ANDTHEPATH
AHEAD (1998); R.C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA
(1992); JEFF LYON & PETER GORNER, ALTERED FATES: GENE THERAPY AND THE
RETOOLING OF HUMAN LIFE (1995); J.K. MASON, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF
REPRODUCTION AND PARENTHOOD (1990); GLENN MCGEE, THE PERFECT BABY:
APRAGMATIC APPROACH TO GENETICS (1997);DERELMORGAN, SURROGACY AND
THE MORAL ECONOMY (2000); GREGORY E. PENCE, WHO'S AFRAID OF HUMAN
CLONING? (1998); DIEDERIKA PRETORIUS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: A
WORLDWIDE VIEW OF THE ISSUES (1994); SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF
COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1994); HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART (1994); REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND
THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); REPRODUCTION,
TECHNOLOGY AND RIGHTS (James M. Humber & Robert F Almeder eds., 1996);
JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); MARTINEALIANAROTHBLATT,UNZIPPED
GENES: TAKING CHARGE OF BABY-MAKING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (AMERICA
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similar dramatic developments relating to the end of human life,8 and even
IN TRANSITION-RADICAL PERSPECTIVES) (1997); LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING
EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND INA BRAVE NEW WORLD (1997); CARSON STRONG,
ETHICS INREPRODUCTIVEANDPERINATALMEDICINE: ANEWFRAMEWORK (1997);
JONATHAN WEINER. TIME, LOVE, MEMORY: A GREAT BIOLOGIST AND HIS QUEST
FORTHE ORIGINS OF BEHAVIOR (1999); WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING: FACING
THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY (Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth J.
Thomson eds., 1994); RobertF. Blomquist, CloningEndangeredAnimalSpecies?,
32 VAL. U. L. REv 383 (1998); Cloning Symposium, 38 JURIMETRICS 1 (1997);
Bernard Friedland & Valerie Epps, The Changing Families and the U.S.
Immigration Laws: The Impact of Medical Reproductive Technology on the
Immigration andNationalityAct's Definition ofthe Family, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
429 (1997); Gilbert S. Merritt, From the Scopes Trial to the Human Genome
Project: Where is Biology Talang the Law?, 67 U. CIN. L. REV 365 (1999); Mary
Z. Pelias & MargaretM. DeAngelis, The New Genetic Technologies: New Options,
New Hope, and New Challenges, 45 LOY. L. REV 287 (1999); Patricia (Winme)
Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for National Legislation, 37
JURIMETRICS 1 (1996); Symposium, Respecting Genetic Privacy, 40 JURIMETRICS
1 (1999); Lara Beth Winn, Special Labeling Requirements for Genetically
Engineered Food: How SoundAre the Analytical Frameworks Used by FDA and
Food Producers?, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 667 (1999); Susan O'Hara, Comment,
The Use of Genetic Testing in the Health Insurance Industry: The Creation of a
"Biologic Underclass, " 22 SW. U. L. REV 1211 (1993).
s See ROBERT L. BARRY, BREAKING THE THREAD OF LIFE: ON RATIONAL
SUICIDE (1994); BASIC QUESTIONS ON SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA. ARE THEY EVER
RIGHT9 (Gary P Stewart & John Frederic Kilner eds., 1998); MARGARET PABST
BATrN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH: ESSAYS IN BIOETHICS ON THE END OF LIFE
(1994); DAN W. BROCK, LIFEANDDEATH: PHILOSOPHICALESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (1993); GEORGE M. BURNELL, FINAL CHOICES: TO LIVE OR TO DIE IN AN
AGE OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY (1993); DONALD W Cox & RALPH MERO,
HEMLOCK'S CuP- THE STRUGGLE FOR DEATH WITH DIGNITY (1993); DAVID
CUNDiFF, EUTHANASIA IS NOTTHEANSWER: AHOSPICEPHYSICIAN'S VIEW (1992);
DEATH, DYING AND THE LAW (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 1996); EZEKIEL J.
EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL ETHICS IN A LIBERAL POLITY
(1994); EUTHANASIA AND OTHER MEDICAL DECISIONS CONCERNING THE END OF
LIFE (P.1. Van DerMaas et al. eds., 1992); EUTHANASIA, CLINICALPRACTICE AND
THE LAW (Luke Gormally ed., 1994); EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL,
CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (John Keown ed., 1995); EUTHANASIA.
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Carol Wekesser ed., 1995); EUTHANASIA. THE GOOD OF
THEPATIENT,THE GOODOF SOCIETY (Robert I. Misbm ed., 1992); GEREB. FULTON
& EILEEN K. METRESS, PERSPECTIVES ON DEATH AND DYING (1995); HENRY R.
GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE: POLICY INNOVATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1992);
CARLOS F GOMEZ, REGULATINGDEATH: THE CASE OFTHENETHERLANDS (1991);
1999-2000]
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HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND THE DUTCH
CURE (1997); JAMES M. HOEFLER, DEATHRGHT: CULTURE, MEDICINE, POLITICS,
AND THE RIGHT TO DIE (1994); How SHALL WE DIE?: HELPING CHRISTIANS
DEBATEASSISTED SUICIDE (Sally B. Geis & Donald E. Messers eds., 1997); DEREK
HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT: THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED
SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991); BRIAN P JOHNSTON, DEATH AS A SALESMAN:
WHAT'S WRONG WITH ASSISTED SUICIDE (1997); F.M. KAMM, MORALITY,
MORTALITY: DEATH, AND WHOM TO SAVE FROM IT (1993); KILLING AND LETTING
DIE (Bonnie Stembocked., 1980);NANCYM.P. KING,MAKING SENSE OFADVANCE
DIRECTIVES (1996); EDWARD J. LARSON & DARRELW. AMUNDSEN, ADIFFERENT
DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION (1998); WILLIAM F MAY,
TESTING THE MEDICAL COVENANT: ACTIVE EUTHANASIA AND HEALTH CARE
REFORM (1996); ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE (2d ed. 1995); MERCY OR
MURDER?: EUTHANASIA, MORALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (Kenneth R. Overberg
ed., 1993); G. STEVENNEELEY, THE CONSTITUTIONALRGHTTO SUICIDE: ALEGAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION (1994); NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON
LIFE AND THE LAW, WHENDEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA
IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994); SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE:
REFLECTIONS ON LIFE'S FINAL CHAPTER (1993); MARGARET OTLOWSKI,
VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND THE COMMON LAW (1997); PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
DEATH (James M. Humber et al. eds., 1994); PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE (Robert
F Weir ed., 1997); WESLEY J. SMITH, FORCED EXIT: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE FROM
ASSISTED SUICIDE TO LEGALIZED MURDER (1997); PATRICIA A. TALONE, FEEDING
THE DYING: RELIGION AND END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS (1996); MARILYN WEBB, THE
GOODDEATH: THENEWAMERICAN SEARCH TO RESHAPETHE END OF LIFE (1997);
Allen J. Bennett, When Is Medical Treatment "Futile"?, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 35
(1993); J.R. Curtis et al., Use ofthe Medical Futility Rationale in Do-Not-A ttempt-
Resuscitation Orders, 273 JAMA 124 (1995); Steven Goldberg, The Changing
Face ofDeath: Computers, Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV
659 (1991); Amnir Halevy & Baruch Brody, Brain Death: ReconcilingDefinitions,
Criteria, and Tests, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 519 (1993); James S. Reitman,
The Dilemma of "Medical Futility"--A "Wisdom Model"forDecisionmaking, 12
ISSUES L. & MED. 231 (1996); George P Smith, II, Utility and the Principle of
Medical Futility: Safeguarding Autonomy and the Prohibition against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (1995); Marc D.
Stem, "And You Shall Choose Life "--Futility and the Religious Duty to Preserve
Life, 25 SETONHALLL. REV. 997 (1995); RobertM. Taylor & John D. Lantos, The
Politics of Medical Futility, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (1995); Joan Teno et al.,
Prognosis-Based Futility Guidelines: Does Anyone Win?, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS
SOC'Y 1202 (1994); StuartJ. Youngner, DefiningDeath: A Superficial andFragile
Consensus, 49 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 570 (1992); Samantha Weyrauch,
Acceptance of Whole-Brain Death Criteria for Determination of Death: A
Comparative Analysis of the United States and Japan, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
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the development of new life forms." Among the more pressing challenges
to the legal system are the emergence of new information technologies and
the resulting commercial applications.'l Countries such as China are
attempting to use "e-commerce" and other forms of digital activity to
leapfrog ahead m their economic development." The Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation has undertaken to require that
the bidding on export commodities, the issuance of import and'export
quotas and licenses, and approval of all foreign trade and investment
activities shall all be conducted on-line beginning January 1, 2000.12 Some
observers have even begun to speak about "e-lawyering."'
13
The impacts of these developments are highly vaned. At the same time
that electronc communication enables us to reach across the globe to
initiate and maintain relationships at a level never before possible, these
same technologies distract us from face-to-face interaction just down the
block or within our own homes.' 4 We find much the same paradox at the
91(1999).
9 See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost
Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV 1597 (1993).
'0 See Peter H. Salus, The Net: A BrefHistory ofOngins, 38 JURIMETRICS 671
(1998). For the significance of this development, see, for example, JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); WENDY M. GROSSMAN, NET. WARS (1997); M.
ETHANKATSH,LAWINADIGITALWORLD218-19 (1995) [heremafterKATSH, LAW
IN A DIGITAL WORLD]; KEVIN KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL (1994); ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983); GENE I. ROCHLIN, TRAPPED IN THE
NET: THE UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES OF COMPUTERIZATION (1997);
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK
AND POWER (1988); David S. Ruder, Effective International Supervision of Glo-
bal Securities Markets, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV 317 (1991); Mitsuo
Sato, Emerging Issues Associated with Twenty-Four Hour World Securities
Trading, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV 333 (1991); Symposium, Current
Issues in Electronic Data Interchange: Defining International Electronic
Commerce, 13 J.INT'LL. &BUS. 1 (1992);Recommendation ofthe OECD Council
Concerning Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic
Commerce (visitedMay 16,2000), <http://www.oecd.org/news-and events/release
/guidelinesconsumer.pdf>
I I See First On-LineHope School, BEuING REV., Nov. 29,1999, at 30; Greeting
an E-Business Era, BEIJING REV., Dec. 6, 1999, at 12.
12See Greeting an E-Business Era, supra note 11, at 13.
'3 Paul, supra note 6.
14 See Robert Kraut et al., Internet Paradox: A Social Technology ThatReduces
Social Involvement and Psychological Well-Being?, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1017
1999-2000)
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international level. The processes of technological change are feeding the
consolidation of nation-states into regional entities with increasingly
significant collective authority; however, this is coupled with the disinte-
gration of nation-states-sometimes the same nation-states-along ethnic,
religious, and other lines."5
Lawyers, jurists, and scholars have begun to give a good deal of
attention to the Impact of such developments on particular aspects of
national legal systems. On the other hand, they have given relatively little
attention to the impact of these developments on the law m general,16 or on
international law in particular. We do not have to rely entirely on specula-
tion, however, to conclude that the impact is likely to be profound.
Consider, for example, the experience with admiralty law
For several thousand years, people who went to sea found themselves
entirely on their own once they passed over the horizon after leaving their
home port. Without long-distance communications faster than the vessel
itself, there was simply no way they could contact home for advice or
sustenance. This reality caused not only epic adventures such as Homer's
Odyssey, but also more mundane trips m which sailors were away from
home for weeks, months, or even years. 7 In the course of such travels and
travails, manners often found themselves in distant lands in desperate need
for provisions, rescue from peril, repairs for their ship, medical care for
(1998); John Markoff, A Newer, Lonelier Crowd Emerges in Internet Study, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at Al. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL
COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1994); SHERRY
TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995).
Is See BENJAMINR.BARBER, JIHADVS.MCWORLD (1996); LyntonK. Caldwell,
The Geopolitics ofEnvironmental Policy: TransnationalModification ofNational
Sovereignty, 59 REVISTA JURIDICA U.P.R. 693 (1990); Vaclav Havel, Beyond the
Nation State, 9 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 26 (1999); Symposium, Rethinking
Nationalism and Sovereignty, 45 J. INT'L AFF 307 (1992).
16 See M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF LAW (1989) [hereinafter KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA]; Lawrence Lessig,
The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV L. REV 501
(1999); Peter W Martin, The Internet: "Full and Unfettered Access" to
Law-Some Implications, 26 N. KY. L. REv 181 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, The
Questfor Enabling Metaphorsfor Law and Lawyerng in the Information Age, 94
MICH. L. REV 2029 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Technology and the Future ofLaw,
47 STAN. L. REv 1375 (1995); see also ROBERTH. ANDERSON ETAL., UNIVERSAL
ACCESS TO E-MAIL. FEASIBILITY AND SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS (1995).
17 See RICHARD HENRY DANA, JR., TWO YEARS BEFORE THE MAST: A PER-
.SONAL NARRATIVE (1840); HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (1851).
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themselves, and other necessaries if the voyage was to be continued or
completed. Maritime law developed an entirely distinct set of rules
governing these needs built around the reality that the ship and her crew
were on their own. The ship itself was personified, and therefore capable
of suing andbeing sued.' When away from their home port ships were able
to borrow money or buy supplies or services on the credit of the ship
without reference to the owners' consent or acquiescence.I9 Ships were
responsible for the maintenance and cure of their crew for the duration of
the voyage and beyond.2" The master was authorized to sacrifice part of the
cargo or of the vessel itself to save the rest, with the owners of the saved
portions sharing the losses with the owners of what was sacrificed.2' A
" See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424,438 (1902).
A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is
preserved. In the baptism of launching she receives her name, and from
the moment her keel touches the water she is transformed, and becomes a
subject of admiralty jurisdiction. She acquires a personality of her own;
becomes competent to contract, and is individually liable for her
obligations, upon which she may sue in the name of her owner, and be sued
m her own name. Her owner's agents may not be her agents, and her agents
may not be her owner's agents. She is capable, too, of committing a tort,
and is responsible in damages therefor.
Id. See generally GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 589-94 (2d ed. 1975); CHRISTOPHERJ.S.HILL, MARiTIMELAW95-103
(1981); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw 33-3 8 (2d ed.
1994); Paul Macanus Hebert, The Ongin and Nature ofMaritime Liens, 4 TUL. L.
REV 381 (1930); Alex T. Howard, Jr., Personification of the Vessel. Fact or
Fiction?, 21 J. MAR. L. &COM. 319 (1990).
'9 See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874); The General Smith, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819). See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 18, at
586-817; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 18, at 94-179, 421-62, 675-757
20 See Harden v Gordon, 11 F Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047); see
also Vaughanv. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Warrenv. United States, 340 U.S.
523 (1951); Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949); GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 18, at 281-324; HILL, supra note 18, at 327-329; GUSTAVUS H.
ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55-92, 162-
233, 357-708 (1939); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 18, at 289-311.
21 See Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386 (1895); Star of Hope, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 203
(1869); E.J. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Vance, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 162 (1856);
Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270 (1850); Vlassopoulos v. British &
Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 1 K.B. 187 (1929); see also THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN bk.
14, tit. 2, frag. 1 (Umv. Penn. Press 1985) (533 C.E.); GILMORE & BLACK, supra
note 18, at 244-71, ROBINSON, supra note 20, at 764-92; SCHOENBAUM, supra note
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stranger who undertook the rescue of a ship or cargo m peril was entitled
to a salvage award to compensate for the labor and risk.'
These rules of admiralty law had no counterpart m the law applicable
to land-based transactions or events. Each unique rule resulted from the
ship being on its own on the lhgh seas. With the advent of the telegraph,
this independence began to change. There followed m succession regularly
scheduled cargo and passenger lines, "wireless telegraphy" (radio), ship-to-
shore telephones, telex, telefacsunile, e-mail, and the Internet. Each of
these innovations undercut the traditionally self-reliant nature of maritime
voyages. Now a master can contact the owners of the vessel or the
managing agents of the owners beforemcurrmng an unscheduled maj or debt
or before arranging the discharge of significant obligations. With the
advent of rail and then air travel, the home office can send someone out to
the vessel to determine many of the questions that the ships' masters
formerly had to decide completely on their own.' Such is the inertia of the
law, however, that most of the unique doctrines of maritime law have
continued to hold sway, with only occasional departures by precedent or
statute to correspond to the new realities.24 But these changes have begun,
18, at 811-60.
2 See Merritt & Chapman Demck & Wrecking Co. v. United States, 274 U.S.
611 (1927); The Elfida, 172 U.S. 186 (1898); The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
1 (1869); Semco Salvage & Marine Pte. Ltd. v. Lancer Navigation Co., 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 323 (1997) (H.L.). See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 18, at 532-
85; HILL, supra note 18, at 184-222; ROBINSON, supra note 20, at 709-63;
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 18, at 782-8 10.
23 See May v. Hamburg-Amerikamsche Packetfahrt Aktiengesellschaft, 290
U.S. 333 (1933) (noting that the head office sent a "marine superintendent" to
determine whether to undertake immediate repairs or to continue a voyage without
repairs).
24 See Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-
950 (1994) (creating a workers' compensation system in response to the
industrialization of the loading and unloading of ships); Oil Pollution Liability and
Compensation Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994) (revising the law
relating to oil spills and other marine pollution by oil); Abandoned Shipwreck Act
of 1987, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1994) (establishing title in the state or federal
government to all abandoned shipwrecks embedded in the continental shelf or other
submerged lands of the United States as a response to the new technologies for
locating long-lost ships); Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Extension Act of
1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1994) (extending admiralty jurisdiction to injuries on land
caused by a vessel); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1994)
(extending admiralty jursdiction to deaths on the high seas whether aboard ship or
as a result of aerial navigation); Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31321-31330
[VOL. 88
LAW IN A SHRINKING WORLD
and are likely to continue. Admiralty is one of clearest examples of how
changes m technology lead, slowly and fitfully perhaps, but inexorably, to
changes m law
One other feature of maritime law is worth mentioning. Historically,
maritime law was m a sense a subset of international law While one must
be wary of anachromstically projecting modem concepts of sovereignty
back into the past, the rules of admiralty were understood, at least since the
fall of Rome, to depend on the customs of the sea and not on the authority
of particular rulers?5 The rise of nation-states did lead to the "nationaliz-
(1994) (largely substituting "preferred ship mortgages" forbottomry bonds); Exxon
Corp. v. Central GulfLmes, Inc., 500 U.S. 603 (1991) (considerably expanding the
right of agents for the owners to claim maritime liens against a ship); Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) (adding the requirement of a
"maritime nexus" to the former pure locality test for admiralty jurisdiction over
torts); Archawski v Hamoti, 350 U.S. 532 (1956) (recognizing a right to sue for
restitution m admiralty); May, 290 U.S. at 333 (reinterpreting the owner's liability
for the unseaworthiness of a vessel given the owner's reassertion of control after
damage to the ship); Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 952 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that the containers on a container ship are not "packages" under the
Carnage of Goods by Sea Act's limitation of liability per package provision);
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, 553 F.2d 830
(2d Cir. 1977) (recognmzmg a right to quantum meruit compensation m lieu of "live
salvage"); Admiralty Symposium, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1337 (1999); David 3.
Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the DormantAdmiralty Clause, 28 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 1 (1997); William R. Casto, AdditionalLight on the Origins ofFederal
Admiralty Jurisdiction, 31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 143 (2000); William R. Casto, The
Origins ofFederalAdmiralty Jurisdiction in an Age ofPrvateers, Smugglers, and
Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original
Understanding and the Private Law Orgins ofthe FederalAdmiralty Jursdiction:
A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361 (1999); David W
Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for a
NationalAdmiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275 (1998); Ernest A. Young,
Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV 273 (1999); see also George
Rutherglen, The Contemporary Justificationfor Maritime Arrest and Attachment,
30 WM. &MARY L. REV 541 (1989). The most extreme proposal for assimilating
admiralty law to ordinary law m the United States is the recently emerged argument
that the substance of admiralty law should become a matter for the states instead
of the federal government as it traditionally has been.
25 See WALTER AsHBURNER, THE RHODIAN SEA LAW (1909); GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 18, at 3-11, ROBINSON, supra note 20, at 1-6; Charles Summer
Lobingler, The Maritime Law of Rome, 47 JURID. REV 1 (1935); Gordon W
Paulsen,An Historical Overview ofthe Development of Uniformity in International
Maritime Law, 57 TUL. L. REV 1065 (1983); Timothy J. Runyan, The Rolls of
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ing" of admiralty law, namely its reduction to the status of simply a
specialized part of the law of each nation-state.26 Notwithstanding this
nationalization, maritime law has remained much more internationally
uniform than most other areas of law and the dominance of the field by
international standards has continued to grow in the twentieth century as
the world has become functionally smaller through the use of modem
technology 27 The question then arises: Is the growing reintegration of
maritime law part of a much broader social process caused by exploding
technologies that tie the world more tightly together9 Are the sort of
changes in the substance and style of maritime law still unique to that field,
or are they harbingers of changes already begnmmng across the broad range
of international (and national) law and practice? It is the thesis of this
Article that modem technology, particularly modem information technol-
ogy, is bringing about just such broad-ranging change in the substantive
law, in how law is practiced, and how law is understood.
I. A FEW WORDS ABOUT WORDS
It is commonplace to note that the world has been getting smaller. At
the same time, in terms of the volume of information available, the world
Oleron and the Admiralty Court in Fourteenth Century England, 19 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 95 (1975).
2 See DAVID W ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM: HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS OFPROBLEMS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (1970); ROBINSON, supra note 20, at 7-13; John D. Kimball,
Miles: "This Much and No More , " 25 J. MAR. L. & COM. 319 (1994).
27 See U.N. Convention on the Carnage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules),
Mar. 30, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 608 (entered into force Nov 1, 1992); Visby
Amendments, Feb. 23, 1968, 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY doc. no. 1-2 (entered
into force June 23, 1977) (The United States is not a party to either of these
agreements, although its own Carnage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-
1315 (1994), enacted m 1936, closely follows the provisions of the Hague Rules
that preceded the Hamburg Rules and Visby Amendments.). See generally Jenny
Clift, Electronic Commerce: The UNCITRAL Model Law and Electronic
Equivalents to Traditional Bills of Lading, 27 INT'L BUS. LAW 311 (1999);
Benjamin W Yancey, The Carnage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Vsby and
Hamburg, 57 TUL. L. REV 1238 (1983). See also International Convention on
Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, 20 J. MAR. L. & COM. 589 (1989) (entered into force July
14, 1996); Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, Nov 19,
1976, 16 I.L.M. 606 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1986) (the United States is not a
party to this convention); Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972,28 U.S.T. 3459 (entered into force July
15, 1977); York-Antwerp Rules, 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY doc. no. 4-6
(informal agreement regarding general average adjustments).
[VOL. 88
LAW IN A SHRINKING WORLD
has grown explosively m recent decades. These changes are functions of
science and technology Yet how such sweeping advances, pervasively
influencing everything in our world, have affected international law has
seldom been considered. I introduce this question with a few words about
what I mean by the terms "international law," "science," and "techno-
logy "
International law is usually described as the law governing relations
between nations,21 although the concept today includes certain aspects of
the relations of individuals and collective entities across international
boundaries.2 9 One could expend considerable effort in refining this
definition, considering the role of formal norms, the need for sanctions, and
the nature of relevant legal processes. I will consider some of these aspects
at points later m the Article," but in this preliminary inquiry I am
discussing international law in fairly general terms that do not require
much refinement. The term "international law" is herem used expansively
to describe the role of law to facilitate or constrain actions by nations,
corporations, individuals, and other entities when those actions transcend
national borders.
Even focusing solely on the law governing relations between nations,
we find that international law has undergone profound changes in its
content and structure m the last seventy-five years. The relatively
homogenous community that created classical international law (essentially
the European states and a few other nations that shared European culture)
has expanded into an increasingly heterogeneous community of nations
reflecting highly varied legal traditions and disparate ideologies.3 The
28 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-60 (4th
ed. 1990); ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?: A
REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
2,95-96(1986); MARKW. JANIS,ANINTRODUCTIONTOINTERNATIONALLAW2-3,
182-83 (3d ed. 1999).
29See BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 33, 37; INGRID DETTER DE LUPIS, THE CON-
CEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1987); Lung-chu Chen, Protection of Persons
(Natural andJuridical), 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 542 (1989); M.W Janis, Individuals
as Subjects ofInternationalLaw, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 61 (1984).
30 See infra Part III.
31See Chen Tiqiang, The People's Republic of China and Public International
Law, 8 DALHOUSIEL.J. 3 (1984); Gennady M. Danilenko, The ChangingStructure
of the International Community: Constitutional Implications, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J.
353 (199 1); Maurice Flory, AdaptingInternationalLaw to the Development ofthe
Third World, 26 J. AR. L. 12 (1982); JohnN. Hazard, Socialism and International
PublicLaw, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 251 (1985); Thomas W. Hoya, Marxism
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clearest example ofthis change is the evolution of the UnitedNations from
a "club" of fifty-six members, the majority of winch could be described as
"Western" and nearly all of which applied legal systems derived from
Europe, to a forum of 188 nations representing all cultural traditions,
including many nations wich have returned to their indigenous legal roots
m preference to European legal systems imposed by former colomal
regimes.
32
Although these changes are not all a direct result of scientific or
technological change, one does not have to look very far for evidence of
direct shifts in the law caused by scientific or technological change. Even
on a field apparently so removed from science and technology as interna-
tional law might appear, changes are occurring. First, one must sort out
what one means by the concepts of science and technology For the
purposes of tins Article, I use an ordinary definition of science and
technology- a logically organized body of knowledge that attempts to
achieve practical purposes through replicable processes.33 By this
definition, science is abstract knowledge that, when combined with proper
tools, becomes the technology that changes how we do things and
ultimately how we live. A tool might exist for a considerable time before
its applicability to a particular problem is realized, or a problem and its
solution might be known theoretically for some time before the necessary
tools are developed to allow for its resolution. Only when the tools and
andlnternationalPrvate Law, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 265 (1985); Ewell E.
Murphy, Jr., The Diminishing World of Western Law, 16 TEx.INT'LL.J. 1 (1981);
No-hyoung Park, The Third World as an InternationalLegal System, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 37 (1987); Jeremy Thomas, International Law in Asia: An Initial
Review, 13 DALHOUSIE L.J. 683 (1990); Wang Tieya, The Third World and
International Law, in SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE CHINESE YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 6 (1983) [hereinafter SELECTED ARTICLES]; Surakiart
Sathirathai, Comment, An Understanding of the Relationship Between
InternationalLegalDiscourse and Third World Countries, 25 HARV. INT'LL.J. 395
(1984).
32 See generally Konrad Ginther, Re-DefininglnternationalLawfrom the Point
of View ofDecolonisation and Development and African Regionalism, 26 J. AFR.
L. 49 (1982); John Ntambirweki, The Developing Countries in the Evolution ofan
International Environmental Law, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REv 905
(1991).
33 See EMMANUEL G. MESTHENE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: ITS IMPACT ON
MAN AND SOCIETY 25 (1970); Joseph W Dellapenna, The History ofAbortion:
Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REv 359, 362 (1979).
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necessary knowledge coexist m an organized way can we say that a
particular technology has come into being.
34
Unlike some popular definitions of technology, the highly general
definition I propose does not limit the concept to machines, although it
does posit mechamcal rationality as the ideal model of both science and
technology 35 Such a definition has long been recognized as posing
difficulties in isolating scientific and technological processes from other
forms of human activity 36 This definition is neither final nor perfect, but
it does provide us with an adequate concept for the purposes of this
preliminary inquiry.
The suggestion that changes in science and technology will impact the
socially constructed scheme of ideas known as law, or as international law,
seems to smack of materialistic (specifically, technological) determinsm;
but it does not. Tracing the history of ideas and why they rise and fall has
always been illusive-one lawyer, William Quinn, aptly noted that
"[t]racmg the gradual evolution of an idea over time is like trying to lasso
smoke." 37 One thing, however, is certain: The prevalent ideas of the time
are not simply a result of the technology that appears at a given moment.
In fact, sometimes demand for a technology-a demand that might itself
be driven by the prevalent ideas ofthe time--might drive the development
of the technology 38 Just as there is no guarantee that the emergence of a
new technology will cause most people to adopt the intellectual response
that appears most natural to me, neither can anyone guarantee that demand
for a new technology will be met successfully
There are those who insist that changes in the prevailing ideas of the
time (the "intellectual climate") are simply the result of changing fashions
in ideas. They also miagme that a "history of ideas" can ignore all but the
34 See, e.g., LEWISMUMFORD, TECHNICSANDCIVILIZATION4-6, 107-09,139-42
(1934).
35See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICALSOCIETY3-7, 79 (John Wilkenson
trans., 1964); MUMFORD, supra note 34, at 3-12, 18-22, 31-51, 182-85, 321-33,
364-68; MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIETY 65 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
36 See, e.g., CARL MITCHAM & ROBERT MACKEY, JACQUES ELLUL AND THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 102, 110-17 (1971).
37 William W Quinn, Jr., FederalAcknowledgment ofAmencan Indian Tribes:
The Histoncal Development of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 331
(1990).
31 See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government




changing verbal forms within a language. 39 Tins argument is based upon a
presently fashionable set ofideas know as "postmodermsm." 40Deconstruc-
tion, the interpretive relative in the "postmodern family,"'" is popular in
many academic fields today, including law 42 All knowledge, deconstruc-
tion theorists claim, is merely a social construction between the writer and
(preeminently) the reader, with no possible reference to any objective,
external reality 43 But this theory also dethrones the reader, for the reader's
meaning can no more be fixed than can the author's. Logical consistency
39 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1972).
40 See FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF
LATE CAPITALISM (1991); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN:
PROGRESSANDITS CRITICS (1991); JEAN-FRANCOISLYOTARD, THEPOST-MODERN
CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Bnan Massumi
trans., 1984); WALTER J. ONG, INTERFACES OF THE WORD: STUDIES IN THE
EvOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE (1977) [hereinafter ONG,
INTERFACES OF THE WORD]; Roberto M. Unger, Social Theory- Its Situation and
Its Task: A Critical Introduction (1987).
4, See Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics ofInterpretation, 26
NEWENG. L. REv 1173 (1992).
42 See DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (Drucilla Cornell et
al. eds., 1992); David Jabban, Critical Legal Studies: A Revolution in Legal
Thought, in REVOLUTIONS IN LAW AND LEGAL THOUGHT 153 (Zenon Bankowski
ed., 1991); Jacques Dernda, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of
Authority, " 11 CARDOZO L. REV 919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990); Andreas
Hamifelt, Formalizing Multiple Interpretation ofLegal Knowledge, 3 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 221 (1995); Leslye M. Huff, Deconstructing Sodomy, 5 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 553 (1997); Julie Novkov, Note, A Deconstruction of
(1M)otherhood and a Reconstruction of Parenthood, 19 N.Y.U. REv L. & SOC.
CHANGE 155 (1991).
43 See ANDREWBOYD, LIFE'S LITTLEDECONSTRUCTIONBOOK. SELF-HELP FOR
THE POST-HIP (1998); HARRY M. COLLINS & TREVOR PINCH, THE GOLEM: WHAT
EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SCIENCE (1994); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatn C. Spivak trans., 1977); TERRY EAGLETON, THE
ILLUSIONS OFPOSTMODERNISM (1996);FOUCAULT,ARCHAEOLOGY,supra note 39;
LASCH, supra note 40; LYOTARD, supra note 40; PAULINE M. ROSENAU, POST-
MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND INSTRUSIONS
(1992); UNGER, supra note 40; STEPHEN K. WHITE, POLITICAL THEORY AND
POSTMODERNISM (1991); Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak
and Constitutional "Meaning"for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV 461 (1997);
William Bywater, The Paranoia of Postmodernism, 14 PHIL. & LIT. 79 (1990);
Francis J. Mootz I, The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 31
HoUs. L. REv 873 (1994).
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demands that there are no "subjects" to do the reading and writing. As law
professorAllaniHutchnson observed, "[r]eading ends not in a final affixing
of meaning, but in a temporary respite from a lasting undecidability "4
Hutchinson was not afraid of following tins line of reasoning to its
logical end. Thus, he wrote, "[in]eanig is not transmittedthrough language
by independent subjects, possessed of pre-linguistic thought, but the
communicating subjects are themselves constituted in and through that
discourse itself."'4 Such skepticism about the possibility of truth was
caught by Hutchinson's conclusion that "meaning is always to be argued
for and never to be argued from." No wonder Jorge Luis Borges
concluded that "[t]here is no intellectual exercise winch is not, in the final
analysis, useless."N7 Regis Debray has observed that tins particular vision
is rooted in a mass media generally for whom "the objective world-the
thing there is something to speak of-is what the other media are saying.
Be it hell or heaven, from now on we are going to have to live in tins
haunted hall where mirrors reflect mirrors and shadows chase shadows."
48
One need only recall the Marshall McLuhan scene from Woody Allen's
movie Annie Hall,49 however, to see the absurdity of any such concept of
solely textual meaning.
Such skeptics conclude that the only truth is there is no truth, overlook-
ing the contradiction inherent in such a view Postmodermst skepticism
4Hutchinson, supra note 41, at 1186.
45Id. at 1185.
46Id. at 1188.
47 JORGE LUIS BORGES, Pierre Menard, Author ofthe Quixote, in LABYRINTHS;
SELECTED STORIES AND OTHER WRITINGS 36, 43 (Donald A. Yates & James E.
Irby eds., 1964).
48 REGIS DEBRAY, TEACHERS, WRITERS, CELEBRITIES: THE INTELLECTUALS OF
MODERN FRANCE 118 (David Macey trans., 1985). For a delightful skewering of
the foibles ofdeconstruction theory m literary criticism, seeBernardKnox,Author,
N.Y. REv BOOKS, Nov 16, 1995, at 16. For a feminist criticism of "post-
modernism," see PAULINE JOHNSON, FEMINISM AS RADICAL HUMANISM (1994).
49 ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977). In this scene, Alvy (Woody Allen) and
Annie (Diane Keeton) are waiting in line to buy tickets for a movie and they
overhear a man, apparently a professor, boring his date with a long discussion of
Marshall McLuhan's theories on media. When Alvy challenges the professor's
theories, the professor defends himself by mformmg Alvy that he teaches
commuications at Columbia University. Alvy steps out of line and returns almost
instantly, with the real Marshall McLuhan who promptly demolishes the astounded
professor's theories. Alvy turns to the camera and comments, "Boy, if only life
were like this. "Id.
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renders any possibility of generalization impossible-even generalizations
that would destabilize the very social order that the postmodermsts are
intent on destabilizing. The impossibility of generalizing makes each
example wholly particular, from which no lessons can be gleaned. 0 For
example, just because not every woman is either Catharine MacKinnon or
Phyllis Schafly, does not mean that we cannot say anything meaningful
about women in general."1 Nor can someone who chooses to continue living
simply jump out a seventh-story window because she has decided that
height is a social construction. 2 As David Hume noted some two centuries
ago, humans simply are not capable of such comprehensive doubt as
deconstruction expresses and as jumping out a window would re-
quire-despite posturing to the contrary 3
In fact, much the same holds true for texts. A contrary conclusion could
only lead to the premise that texts have no meaning at all apart from what
a reader chooses to impose on them. s Yet we all convey meaning through
language, and through texts. Just because we do not communicate
perfectly, does not mean that all communication fails.5s Do we really find
such expressions as "keep off the grass" or "drop dead" confusmg? 6 If it
were otherwise, why would we bother putting anything on paper beyond
the single word "TEXT" and allow the reader to put into it anything the
reader likes, from the Bible to Shakespeare, from Henry James, James
Joyce, or Alice Walker-or Jacqueline Susan.57 (How we would imagine
50 See Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism, in
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 131, 151 (Linda Nicholson ed., 1989); Judith Butler,
Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse, in FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM, supra, at 324, 327; Edward L. Rubm, The New Legal Process,
the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV L.
REV 1393, 1401 (1996).
11 am indebted to Allan Hutchinson, a committed postmodermst, for this ob-
servation. See Hutchinson, supra note 41, at 1197
52 See James Allan,A Doubter's Guide to Law and NaturalRight, 28 VICTORIA
U. WELLINGTON L. REV 243,246 (1998).
53 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 1 (1739).
5 See ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142 (Stephen Heath trans.,
1978).
11 See Dems J. Brion, Performing the Constitution, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV
293,310 (1992).
56 See Gerald Graff, "Keep Off the Grass, " "Drop Dead, "and Other Indeter-
minacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV 405 (1982).
57 See Don Herzog, As Many As Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75
CAL. L. REV 609, 629 (1987).
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these authors if all they had produced were that one single word is another
question.)
The belief that all knowledge is socially constructed, or even that law
is sunply a social construction that is ultimately arbitrary, does not explain
why one idea generally comes to be seen as "better" than another, or why
"new" theories succeed m displacing earlier theories or why they do so at
a particular time. In many contexts, theories that today have become
cornerstones of our notions of reality (for example, the atomic theory of
matter), have been around for decades or centuries. Nevertheless, they were
originally seen as marginalized or irrelevant, until the theory displaced the
previously dominant theory I8 My resolution of the tension between the role
of ideas and of material conditions draws on the early work of Thomas
Kuhn, a leading, albeit controversial, historian of science.59
Many scholars read Kuhn as arguing that scientific models are arbitrary
because any particular scientific model (in Kuhn's snob word, a
"paradigm") neither resolves all questions about the relevant experimental
data addressed, nor can clan to be, in any ultimate sense, true.60 Those
readers would have us conclude that, objectively, one scientific paradigm
is as good as another. Kuhn himself seems to have supported tis notion in
some of his later writings.61 This reading of Kuhn supports the notion that
58 See generally Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE (Otto Neurath ed., 2d ed.
1970) (1962).
" See id., see also THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED
STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 270-92 (1977) [heremafterKUHN,
ESSENTIAL TENSION]. For a simplistic but extended attempt to apply Kuhn's
analysis to legal change, see Edward J. Conry & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, Meta-
Jurisprudence: A Paradigm for Legal Studies, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 691 (1996).
o See Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, in CRITICISM AND THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 197, 214-15 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds.,
1970); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS
POLICYMAKERS 12-14 (1990); G. EDWARD WHITE, INTERVENTION AND
DETACHMENT: ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 23-27, 35-36
(1994); D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer- Image, Text, and Title Vi,
45 VAND. L. REV 349, 359-66 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF L .REV 205, 213-17 (1980); Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U.MAMIL.REv 1,20 n.44, 23-24,26 n.65, 77-79,
91-93 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and
Politics, 11 YALE L. &POL'YREV 1, 15-18, 37-38 (1993).
6, See Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 60, at 231, 260-65.
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changes m society and changes m science, are purely functions of
intellectual fashion rather than a response to anything outside of capricious
mnds embracing new ideas.
Read mhins way, Kuhn deserves the harsh criticism sometimes directed
toward Ins work, particularly by scientists and other philosophers or
historians of science.62 However, Kuhn does not have to be read in this
fashion. Following some aspects of Kuhn's thinking shows that the
material conditions of the time shape intellectual fashions at least as much
as intellectual fashions shape matenal conditions.63 As PeterBergerpointed
out, once a tool has been invented its needs tend to dominate those who use
it:
Once produced, the tool has a being of its own that cannot be readily
changed by those who employ it. Indeed the tool may even force the
logic of its being upon its users, sometimes m a way that may not be
particularly agreeable to them. For instance a plow, though obviously a
human product, may compel its users to arrange their agricultural
activity, and perhaps also other parts of their lives, m a way that conforms
to its own logic, and they may have been neither intended nor foreseen by
those who originally devised it The same objectivity characterizes the
non-matenal elements of culture as well. Man [sic] invents a language and
then finds that both his speaking and his thinking are dominated by its
grammar.
64
Material conditions do not affect social and individual attitudes m a
sinple, deterministic way The material conditions of life pose certain core
problems to those living at the time just as particular experimental data
62 See Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology ofSczentific Research
Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 60, at
91, 177-80; Thomas Nagel, The Sleep of Reason-Fashionable Nonsense:
Postmodern Philosophers'Abuse ofScience, THENEW REP., Oct. 12, 1998, at 32,
35-36; Karl Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, in CRITICISM AND THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 60, at 51.
63 See KUHN, ESSENTIAL TENSION, supra note 59, at 261. For examples of
historians who have drawn similar conclusions, see JARED MASON DIAMOND,
GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL. THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1997); LINDA
GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 180-
82, 189-91 (1977); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept,
79 3. AM. HIsT. 11, 20-30 (1992).
64 PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY- ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY OF RELIGION 9 (1967).
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pose certain core problems to scientists workng with the data. Intellectual
paradigms will be constructed to address core problems and succeed in
gaining adherents if the paradigm appears to resolve the core problems,
even while leaving unresolved (or perhaps exacerbating) problems that are
seen as on the periphery Is The new intellectual paradigm shapes further
thought and brings about at least some changes in future material condi-
tions. In a sort of interactive loop the changed material conditions
-whatever the source of those changes-alters the core problems of the
society and thus leads to the rise of new intellectual paradigms. 66 Law
professor David Luban has suggested an example that perhaps sets the
distinction m clearer perspective:
Causal explanations are standpomt-and-purpose-relative. A surge of
electricity through a wire will not cause it to ignite unless oxygen is
present, so m one sense the presence of oxygen has just as much a claim
as the surge of electricity to be the cause of the wire's igniting. The
electricity, like the oxygen and other factors such as the wire's conductiv-
ity, are contributing conditions of the wire igniting. Ordinarily, however,
we would say that it was the electricity, not the oxygen, that caused the
wire to ignite: if, in answer to the question "What made the wire bum
up?," someone replied "The air did it," we would treat the reply as a
wisecrack. All contributing conditions are created equal, but for practical
explanatory purposes we must inevitably distinguish background
conditions (such as the presence of oxygen) from foreground conditions,
such as the surge of electricity. The ones m wluch we are interested move
to the foreground, and precisely these we dignify by calling them causes
of events.67
Luban appears to consider the choice of foreground and background factors
to be a matter of mere preference rather than a result of a particular fit
61 See WHITE, supra note 60, at 41-43; Feyerabend, supra note 60, at 220;
Lakatos, supra note 62, at 116-18; Schroeder, supra note 60.
6See J. HERBiE DIFONzO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND
LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 1-12 (1997); cf.
RAYMOND G. DEVRIES, MAKING MIDwivEs LEGAL. CHILDBIRTH, MEDICINE, AND
THE LAW 9-16 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that law and medicine form an interactive
system m which each affects the other).
67 David Luban, Getting the Word, 91 MICH. L. REv 1247, 1259 (1993)
(emphasis in original). Luban derives this example from two sources: H.L.A. HART
& TONY HONOI±, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 34-35 (2d ed. 1985) and J.L. Mackie,
Causes and Conditions, 2 AM. PHIL. Q. 245 (1965); see also JOELFEINBERG, HARM
TO OTHERS 177 (1984).
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between an aspect of the "contributing conditions" and the event that leads
most people to ascribe that aspect as the cause. He fails to note that oxygen
is seen as a background condition precisely because it is always present,
while electricity is seen as the "cause" because it is a new variable, the
introduction of which precipitates the fire. While clamas about the
causation of any complex human action will remain controversial, to insist
that only socially constructed attitudes count is arbitrary and shortsighted.
Changes m science andtechnologyhave transformative powerbecause
the prevalent ideas in science and technology today are central to the
material conditions m which they arise. Prevailing ideas do not change
simply because someone has a catchy way of expressing a new idea wich
is somehow imposed on all society through legal institutions. Even
postmodermsm can be understood as an effort to reflect in the social
sciences and the humanities (including law) the dramatic intellectual
changes wrought by the theory of relativity and the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle." These theories, themselves scientific, are rooted in the problems
68 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature ofConstitutionalSpace: WhatLawyers
Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV L. REV 1, 14-15, 31 (1989); R.
George Wright, Should the Law Reflect the World? -Lessons for Legal Theoryfrom
Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 855 (1991). See generally JOHN M.
CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGALDISCOURSE (1990); ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING
ON THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1988);
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford
Levmson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1987); DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983); THE
POLITICS OF LAW" A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982); JAMES B.
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURALAND LEGAL CRITICISM
(1990) [hereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION]; JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF
LANGUAGE, CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY (1984); J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive
Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Jeffrey M. Blum, Critical
Legal Studies and the Rule ofLaw, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 59 (1990); Robert M. Cover,
Forword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV L. REV 4 (1983); Robert W Gordon,
UnfreezingLegalReality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 195
(1987); Alan Hunt, The BigFear" Law Confronts Postmodernism, 35 MCGILLL.J.
507 (1990); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV 104 (1989);
Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim ofAuthority, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209
(1989); Richard Weisberg, Coming of Age Some More: 'Law and Literature'
Beyond the Cradle, 13 NOVA L. REV 107 (1988); Robin L. West, Adjudication is
Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-Literature Movement, 54
TENN. L. REV. 203 (1987); Robin L. West, Junsprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI.
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confronted when the available technologies turned up new core problems
that old science simply no longer adequately addressed.
Law is easier to conceive as simply a social construction than many
other intellectual fields. Yet for law as well, the material conditions pose
core problems that legal systems must resolve, and constrain how those
problems can be resolved.69 A legal solution, in order to be stable, must to
a considerable extent reflect the sense of the community-a sense that m
turn is responding to the material conditions of the time and place. Even
revisiomst legal historian Robert Gordon who, while arguing that we
should leave space for alternative voices from the past, has recognized that
law represents a particular vision of social reality, a vision that was not
imposed on the dissenters. The past, Gordon wrote, represents
not on a single developmental path but on multiple trajectories of
possibility, the path actually chosen being chosen not because it had to be
but because the people pushing for alternatives were weaker and lost out
m their struggle or because both winners and losers shared a common
consciousness that set the agenda for all of them, highlighting some
possibilities and suppressing some others completely 70
Turning back to international legal processes, we find the idea that
science and technology has had a profound impact on international law has
seldom been recognized or even considered. One will find little direct
acknowledgement of such effects m the source materials of international
law7 1 International law, in fact, has had rather little to say about science or
technology except for a few treaties regulating the use of technologies,'
L. REv 1 (1988) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence and Gender].
69 Recall the brief history of admiralty and maritime law in the introduction to
this Article, supra notes 17-27
70 Robert W Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV 57, 112
(1984).
7' But see John K. Gamble, International Law and the Information Age, 17
MICH. J.INT'LL. 747 (1996); Manfred Lachs, Views From theBench: Thoughts on
Science, Technology and World Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 673 (1992).
'7 See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Space Objects Convention];
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Orgamzation, Aug. 20,1971,23 U.S.T. 3813 [heremafterIntelsatAgreement]; Sea-
Bed Arms Control Treaty, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701 [hereinafter Sea-Bed
Treaty]; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21
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guarantees of freedom of scientific research in the high seas,73 on Antarc-
tica, 7 4 and in outer space,75 and efforts to secure protection for intellectual
property 76 Science and technology have changed the ends pursued by
international law, the means available to international law for pursuing
those ends, and the nature and structure of international law itself. We
shall have to consider each of these changes if we are to begin to under-
stand how science and technology are impacting upon international legal
processes.
II. ALTERING ENDS AND MEANS
I begin to examine the inpact of science and technology on interna-
tional law by summarizing the ways m which developments have created
an undeniable need for international collaboration where formerly each
nation might have felt itself autonomous. As a result of changes, states,
international organizations, multinational corporations, and individuals
have all recognized new purposes and goals in their legal interactions on
the international plain. In short, they have had to learn to cope with new
ends for international legal processes. Following our brief look at the
changed ends of international law, I provide a brief summary of the ways
m which science and technology have developed new means for creating,
inplementing, and enforcing both older international norms and newer
norms.
U.S.T. 483 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty]; Treaty Bannmg Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, m Outer Space and under Water, Aug. 5, 1963,
14 U.S.T. 1313 [hereinafter Partial Test Ban Treaty]; Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093 [heremafter IAEA Statute];
Clucago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180
[hereinafter ICAO Convention].
73 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts.
87(1)(t), 143, 238-65, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
74 See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, arts. I, II, 12 U.S.T. 794.
75 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States m the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, arts. I, IX, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
76 See Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341 [here-
mafter The Berne Convention]; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28
U.S.T. 7645. See generally Symposium, Fundamentals ofInternational Copyright:
The Impact ofBerne, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1989).
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A. Ends Alteration
Examples abound of problems created by science and technology that
cannot be addressed adequately within the confines of a single country
where formerly there was no need for international cooperation. For
example, concern to prevent the increasingly horrible reality of war using
modem technology began before anyone ever dreamed of nuclear fission
or fusion,77 yet, these developments dramatically changed the nature of the
problems confronting the international community Since 1945, the
international community has had to struggle with controlling the develop-
ment,78 proliferation,79 and use of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons, 0 as
I See Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact];
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277
78 See Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 72; Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973
I.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection Order of June 22), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Judgment of Dec.
20); Shimoda v. Japanese Government, 8 JAP ANN. INT'L L. 212 (Tokyo Dist.
Ct. 1964); George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Protecting the Seas from Nuclear Pollution,
33 S.C. L. REv 197 (1981); Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The
Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J.
648 (1955).
79 See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 72; Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435
[hereinafter ABM Treaty]; Jack H. McCall, Jr., "The Inexorable Advance of
Technology "" Amencan and International Efforts to Curb Missile Proliferation,
32 JURIMETRICS 387 (1992); John N. O'Brien, International Auspices for the
Storage ofSpentNuclearFuel as a Nonproliferation Measure, 21 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 857 (1981).
8o See Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War Outbreak,
Sept. 30, 1971, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 22 U.S.T. 1590; Sea-Bed Treaty, supra note 72;
Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear
Weapons, G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doe.
A/5100 (1962); RICHARD A. FALK ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981); ELLIOTTL. MEYROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1990); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMICS OF
DISPUTES- AND WAR-LAw 324-48 (1954); Louis Ren6 Beres, Confronting Nuclear
Terrorism, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV 129 (1990).
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well as with the development and utilization of peaceful uses of atomic
energy8' and the safe disposal of nuclear wastes.82
Almost as dramatic as nuclear problems are the emerging problems of
managing activities m outer space.83 Less emotive, but more immedi-
81 See IAEA Statute, supra note 72; PAUL C. SZASZ, THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (1970); Ann Voorhees
Billingsley, Private Party Protection Against Transnational Radiation Pollution
Through Compulsory Arbitration: A Proposal, 14 CASE W RES. J. INT'L L. 339
(1982); Burrus M. Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack:
Prospects after the Gulf War, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 524 (1992); Michael S. Straubel,
Space Borne Nuclear Power Sources-The Status of Their Regulation, 20 VAL. U.
L.REV 187 (1986); Judith A. Perritano, Note, International Liabilityfor Nuclear
Pollution, 11 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV 75 (1987); William J. Broad, Quest
for Fusion Power Is Going International, N.Y TIMES, July 28, 1992, at C2.
82 Consider some states practice of placing nuclear waste facilities close to an
international border in order that any resulting water pollution will flow across the
border, thereby removing one basis for objections to the placement within the
upper basin state. See Joaquim Evansto da Silva, Transboundary WaterResources
Conflicts in the Iberian Peninsula 1, 4-6 (1987) (unpublished monograph, on file
with author). The European Parliament has adopted a non-binding resolution to
prohibit the placing of such facilities within 100 kilometers of any international
border. Id. at 5. See generally Daniel P Finn, Ocean Disposal of Radioactive
Wastes: The Obligation of International Cooperation to Protect the.Manne
Environment, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 621 (1981); Giinther Handl, Managing Nuclear
Wastes: The International Connection, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 267 (1981); George
C. Kasoulides, State Responsibility and Assessment of Liability for Damage
Resultingfrom Dumping Operations, 26 SANDIEGO L. REv 497 (1989); Robert A.
Kaplan, Comment, Into the Abyss: International Regulation ofSubseabedNuclear
Waste Disposal, 139 U. PA. L. REV 769 (1991); David G. Spak, Comment, The
Needfor a Ban on All Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Ocean, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L.
&Bus. 803 (1986).
3 See Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space for Peaceful Purposes, Apr. 15, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., T.I.A.S. No. 11433;
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 75; BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 267-7 1; CARLQ.
CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1982); J.E.S.
FAWCEIT, OUTER SPACE: NEW CHALLENGES TO LAW ANDPOLICY (1985); ANDREW
J. YOUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN THE SPACE STATIONS' ERA (1989); Rene Ct6, La
mutation du rdgimejundique des espaces en droit international public et le r6le
des intrants technologiques, 27 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 113 (1989); Stephen Gorove,
Legal and Policy Issues of the Aerospace Plane, 16 J. SPACE L. 147 (1988); Roy
Carleton Howell, International Telecommunications and the Law: The Creation of
Pan African Satellites, 31 How. L.J. 575 (1988); Edward G. Lee & D.W Sproule,
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris: The Cosmos 954 Claim, 26 CAN.
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ately affecting people's lives, has been the highly effective regime for the
cooperative management of activities in the atmosphere.84 Recent attention
has turned to providing security for digital systems m the face of hostile
actions by foreign states or even major crmial activities.85
Similarly likely to affect people's lives, but with even less public
notice, is the increasing globalization of markets and enterprises made
possible by modem communication technologies. Indeed, the regulation of
communication technologies has become an arena of international
contention. 6 Even something as snple as determining the names to be
Y.B. INT'L L. 273 (1988); Steven A. Levy, INTELSAT. Technology, Politics and
the Transformation of a Regime, 29 INT'L ORG. 655 (1975); Ni Zhengyu, On
Definition andDelimitation ofOuter Space, in SELECTEDARTICLES,supra note 31,
at 106; David Enrico Reibel, Environmental Regulation of Space Activity: The
Case of OrbitalDebris, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (1991); Martin A. Rothblatt, New
Regulatory Ideas and Concepts in Space Telecommunications, 20 J. SPACE L. 27
(1992); Paula K. Speck, Comment, Competition in International Satellite
Telecommunications: Alternative Avenues, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 517 (1985); Alan
Michael Solana, Note, The International Telecommunication Union and the Third
World's QuestforEquitable Access to the Orbit/Spectrum Resource, 4 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 183 (1984); Ole Varmer, Note, The Third World's Search for
Equitable Access to the Geostationary Satellite Orbit, 11 ILSA J. INT'L L. 175
(1987).
"See ICAO Convention, supra note 72; see also Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24
U.S.T. 565 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 (entered into force
Oct. 14, 1971); Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941 (entered into force Dec. 4,
1969). See generally Jeswald W Salacuse, The Little Pnnce and the Businessman:
Conflicts and Tensions in Public International Air Law, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 807
(1980); Edith Brown Weiss, InternationalResponses to Weather Modification, 29
INT'L ORG. 805 (1975); Elizabeth Cuadra, Note, AirDefense Identification Zones:
Creeping Jurisdiction in the Airspace, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 485 (1978).
11 See Kent Alexander & Scott Charney, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931
(1996); Nicolas Laos, Information Warfare and Low Intensity Operations, 4
PERCEPTIONS No. 2, at 174 (June-Aug. 1999); Edward M. Wise, Criminal Law:
Sex, Crime, and Cyberspace, 43 WAYNEL. REV 137 (1996); Howard L. Steele, Jr.,
Comment, The Web that Binds Us All: The Future Legal Environment of the
Internet, 19 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 495 (1997).
86 See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (voiding regulations requiring a license to export encryption codes as a prior
restraint of speech); Draft Convention on Freedom ofInformation, U.N. GAOR,
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26th Sess., Agenda Item 51 Annexes (No. 51) 1, U.N. Doc. A/8340 (1971);
Resolution on Information Facilities in Under-Developed Regions of the World,
G.A. Res. 633, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952); Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, available at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/blllulc/fhact99/1990s/ucita.htm> (visited Mar. 28,
2000). See generally Int'l Chamber of Comm., Draft Uniform Rules ofConductfor
Interchange of Trade Data by Teletransmission (UNCID), 3 COMPUTERL. &PRAC.
105 (1987); ALAN SCHWARTZ & SIMSON GARFINKEL, STOPPING SPAM (1998);
Jonathan D. Aronson, Trade in Telecommunications Services, 19 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP L. 411 (1989); Jens Evensen, Aspects of International Law Relating to
Modern Radio Communications, 115 RECUEIL DES COURS 471 (1965); Mark B.
Feldman, Commercial Speech, Transborder Data Flows and the Right to
Communicate under International Law, 17 INT'L LAW 87 (1983); A. Michael
Froomkm, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity,
Digital Cash, and DistributedDatabases, 15 J. L. & COM. 395 (1996); Robert M.
Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National Level? Thoughts on
the Possible Needfor International Privacy Rules, 41 VILL. L. REV 129 (1996);
David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information
Superhighway (WhereAre the Public Forums on the Information Superhighway?),
46 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1995); Martin E. Halstuk, Bits, Bytes, and the Right to
Know: How the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Holds the Key to Public
Access to a Wealth of Useful GovernmentDatabases, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 73 (1999); Christian A. Herter, Jr., The Electromagnetic
Spectrum:A Critical NaturalResource, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 651 (1985); Howell,
supra note 83; M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and
the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681 (1995) [hereinafter Katsh, Rights,
Camera, Action]; Y.M. Kolossov, Prospects for the International Treaty on
Telecommunications, 27 CAL. W L. REV 173 (1990); Karl P Sauvant,
TransborderData Flows andtheDeveloping Countries, 37 INT'LORG. 359 (1983);
David E. Sorkmn, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 45 BUFF L. REV 1001 (1997); Symposium, Data
ProtectionLaw and the European Union 's Directive: The Challengeforthe United
States, 80 IOWAL. REV 431 (1995); R. Hayes Johnson, Jr., Case Note, Defamation
in Cyberspace: A Court Takes a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway in
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v Prodigy Services, 49 ARK. L. REV 589 (1996); DenaR.
Klopfenstem, Comment, Deciphering the Encryption Debate: A Constitutional
Analysis of Current Regulations and a Prediction for the Future, 48 EMORY L.J.
765 (1999); Anthony Paul Miller, Teleinformatics, Transborder Data Flows and
the Emerging Struggle for Information: An Introduction to the Amval of the New
Information Age, 20 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 89 (1986); Ryan Alan Murr,
Comment, Privacy and Encryption in Cyberspace: First Amendment Challenges
to ITAR, EAR and Their Successors, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv 1401 (1997); Matthew
C. Siderits, Comment, Defamation in Cyberspace: Reconciling Cubby, Inc. v.
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used on the Internet has become a complex and troubling issue. 7 One of
the more important such events, if only because states have hardly begun
to address collective regulation, is the impending globalization of major
financial markets,88 along with the emergence of international electromc
commerce.
89
Compuserve, Inc. and Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 79 MARQ. L.
REV 1065 (1996); Solana, supra note 83; Speck, supra note 83; Varmer, supra
note 83.
87 See Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the
Emerging Law ofCybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1995) <http://www.unch.
edu/-soltvlilburkihtml>; Dan L. Burk, TrademarkDoctrnesfor GlobalElectromc
Commerce,49 S.CAR.L.REV 695 (1998); Clark W. Lackert,InternationalEfforts
Against Trademark Counterfeiting, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV 161, Jeffrey M.
Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International
Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433 (1993); Adrian Wolff,
Comment, Pursuing Domain Name Pirates Into Uncharted Waters: Internet
Domain Names That Conflict With Corporate Trademarks, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV
1463(1997); FTC StaffWants NetRegistrars to SuspendDomains Having 'Clearly
False' Contact Info, 68 U.S.L.W 2266 (Nov. 9, 1999); ICANNAccredits WIPO,
supra note 6.
88 See THOMAS P VARTANIAN ET AL., 21ST CENTURY MONEY, BANKING &
COMMERCE (1998); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A NewModel
for Transfer and Pledge ofInterest in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12
CARDOZO L. REV 305 (1990); David G. Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16
HARv. J. L. &PUB. POL'Y 327 (1993); Ruder, supra note 10; Sato, supra note 10;
Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of
Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24
J.MARSHALLL.REv.299 (1991); Jane Kaufinan Win, Couriers WithoutLuggage:
Negotiable Instruments andDigital Signatures, 49 S.C.L.REV 739(1998); Bryan
S. Schultz, Comment, Electronic Money, Internet Commerce, and the Right to
Financial Privacy: A Call for New Federal Guidelines, 67 U. CIN. L. REV 779
(1999); Speer, supra note 6.
89 See Drafl Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures, United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law, 33d Sess., UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.76
(May 25, 1998); Law on Electronic Transactions (Italy) (visited Mar. 30, 2000),
<http://www.aipa.it/english[4/law[3/law5997.asp> (delegating Act, English trans-
lation); Presidential Decree No. 513 (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://www.aipa.
itlenglish[4/law[3/pdecree51397.asp> (regulations, English translation); UNIF
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999) (visited Apr. 4,2000), <http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.pdf>; see generally EDWARDA. CAVAZOS
& GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAw" YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES INTHE
ON-LINE WORLD (1994); JOHN DICKIE, INTERNET AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
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LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1999); ALAN M. GAHTAN ET AL., INTERNET LAW"
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS (1998); DAVID
JOHNSTON ET AL., CYBERLAW" WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DOING
BUSINESS ONLINE (2000); C. Bradford Biddle, LegislatingMarket Winners:Digital
Signature Laws andtheElectronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV
1225 (1997); Leah Brannon, RegulatingDrugPromotion on the Internet, 54 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 599 (1999); Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer
Transactions in Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulationls Inadequate, 49 S.C.
L. REV 847 (1998); Walter A. Effross, The LegalArchitecture of Virtual Stores:
World Wide Web Sites and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SANDIEGO L.REV
1263 (1997); John P Freeman, A Business Lawyer Looks at the Internet, 49 S.C.
L. REV 903 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation
Teaches About Internet Regulation, 32 INT'L LAW 1115 (1998); John K. Halvey,
The Virtual Marketplace, 45 EMORY L.J. 959 (1996); Larry Irving, Safeguarding
Consumers'Interests in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGALF 1, Gregory E. Maggs,
Internet Solutions to Consumer Protection Problems, 49 S.C. L. REV 887 (1998);
Diana J.P McKenzie, Commercial Transactions on the Global Information
Infrastructure: Commerce on the Net: Surfing Through Cyberspace Without
Getting Wet, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247 (1996); Thomas G.
Melling, Washington's Electronic Authentication Act: Eliminating Legal
Uncertainties Through Default Rules, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1247 (1997);
Christopher Millard & Robert Carolina, Commercial Transactions on the Global
Information Infrastructure: A European Perspective, 14 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 269 (1996); Morgan, supra note 6; Raymond T. Nimmer,
Commercial Transactions on the Global Information Infrastructure: Electronic
Contracting: LegalIssues, 14 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 211 (1996);
Paul, supra note 6; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Margaret G. Stewart, False Alarm?, 51
FED. COMM. L.J. 811 (1999); R.J. Robertson, Jr., Electronic Commerce on the
Internet and the Statute ofFrauds, 49 S.C. L. REV 787 (1998); Howard B. Stravitz,
Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is Required on the
Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925 (1998); Symposium, Current
Issues in Electronic Data Interchange: Defining International Electronic
Commerce, supra note 10; Tebo, supra note 6; Catherine M. Downey, Comment,
The High Price of a Cashless Society: Exchanging Privacy Rights for Digital
Cash?, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 303 (1996); Christopher B.
Woods, Comment, Commercial Law: Determining Repugnancy in an Electronic
Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic Writing and Signature Legislation,
52 OKLA. L. REV 411 (1999); Alvey & Kaut, supra note 6; Bogmo, Fraud
Schemes, supra note 6; Coming Soon, supra note 6; Cutter, supra note 6; FDA
Warns, supra note 6; Felsenthal, supra note 6; ICANNAccredits WIPO, supra note
6; McCarthy, supra note 6; McGolnck, supra note 6; OECD Guidelines, supra note
6;PyramidSchemes,supra note 6; U.S., EU Will Not Sign, supra note 6; U.S. Wary
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Resource management is m many respects the most pervasive area m
which advancing technology creates new challenges for international law
The development of the technology enabling the first meaningful explora-
tion of Antarctica led immediately to a treaty regulating activities on the
frozen continent,9° and the approach of technologies for exploiting
Antarctica's natural resources has prompted a new treaty postponing, and
perhaps preventing, the exploitation of those resources.9' Another early
manifestation of the effects of new technologies for the exploitation of
natural resources and the concentration of that technology in particular
nations was the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.'
The ongoing profound changes m the law of the sea provide particu-
larly dramatic examples of such effects of science and technology
Development of technology for the exploitation of offshore oil led directly
to the emergence of an entirely new body of law relating to the continental
shelf.93 Modem fishing technology fostered the creation of a new concept
But Optimistic as EUStates Craft Own E-Signature Laws Based on EC Directive,
68 U.S.L.W 2389 (Jan. 11, 2000).
0 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 74. See generallyF.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC
LAwANDPoLITICs (1982); J. PeterA. Bernhardt, Sovereignty inAntarctica, 5 CAL.
W INT'L L.J. 297 (1975).
9'See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4,
1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-22 (1992); Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Nov. 25, 1988,27 I.L.M. 868; Convention
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 33
U.S.T. 3476. See generally THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS
(Arnfin Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng eds., 1991); RUDIGER WOLFRUM, THE
CONVENTION ON THE REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCE
ACTIVITIES: AN ATTEMPTTO BREAKNEW GROUND (1991); Symposim, Antarctic
Conservation, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV 1 (1992).
92 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA. Res.
1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15 (1962), 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963).
See generally Wang Xuan, Permanent Sovereignty of States over Natural
Resources, in SELECTED ARTICLES, supra note 31, at 125.
93 SeeNorth Sea Continental Shelf(F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3 (Feb. 20); Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
Arbitration between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) & The Sheikh ofAbu
Dhabi, 1 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 247 (1952); Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg.
12,303 (1945) (Proclamation of the Policy of the United States with Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf) (the
Truman Proclamation); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 214-32. See
generallyMYRES S.MCDOUGAL&WILLIAM T.BURKE, THEPUBLIC ORDEROFTHE
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in the law of the sea known as the exclusive economic zone.94 The
developing technology of exploiting mineral nodules and other resources
prompted the articulation of the deep seabed as the "common heritage" of
mankind95 and the still incomplete efforts to create an international
management regime for that "common heritage of all mankind."96 While
we have only recently, and tenuously, begun the effective international
management of whales and related species, 97 the international community
has begun to consider how effectively to coordinate the management of
anadromous fish resources.98 These regimes, like the notion of straight
baselines, owe as much to the new technologies for the exercise of effective
land-based authority over water areas, including for determining where a
OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 630-729 (1962); 1
D.P O'CONNELL, THEINTERNATIoNALLAWOFTHESEA467-509 (I.A. Shearer ed.,
1982).
9' See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); DAVID
ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIvE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (reprinted
1991); BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 206-13, 224-25, 262-65; BARBARA
KWIATI<OWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW OF
THE SEA (2000); SHIGERU ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 41-
67 (rev. ed. 1989); Ann L. Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977); Shigeru Oda, Fisheries under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'LL. 739 (1983); Peter H. Pearse,
From Open Access to Private Property: Recent Innovations in Fishing Rights as
Instruments ofFisheries Policy, 23 OCEAN DEv & INT'L L. 71 (1992); Francisco
Orrego Vicufla, La zone iconomique exclusive: rigime et naturejuridique dans le
droit international, 199 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1986).
95 See Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor,
and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits ofNational Jurisdiction, Dec. 17, 1970,
10 I.L.M. 220.
96 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73;
BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 252-57; 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 93, at 449-57;
Philippe Kirsch & Douglas Fraser, The Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission
afterSix Years: Review andProspects, 26 CAN. Y.B. INT'LL. 119 (1988); Bernard
H. Oxman, The High Seas and the International Seabed Area, 10 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 526 (1989).
97 See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946,
62 Stat. 1716; MCDOUGAL&BURKE,supra note 93, at948-52; PatnciaBirme, The
Role ofDeveloping Countries in Nudging the International Whaling Commission
from Regulating Whaling to Encouraging Nonconsumptive Uses of Whales, 12
ECOLOGYL.Q. 937 (1985); Anthony D'Amato & SudhirK. Chopra, Whales: Their
EmergingRight to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21 (1991).
9 See MCDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 93, at 952-55.
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vessel is located, as they do to the new technologies for exploiting
resources located m the seas. 9 This is exemplified by the broadening of the
territorial sea from three to twelve miles."° On the other hand, no
comparable international regime has emerged for offshore deep water
ports.
10'
The changing law of the sea is but one instance of the difficult
problems involved in developing effective international regimes for the
exploitation of shared or transboundary resources. 2 For example,
transboundary management of freshwater resources was historically limited
to facilitating navigation. 103 The development of technologies permitting
the construction of major hydropower facilities and large-scale diversions
11 See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); BROWNLIE,
supra note 28, at 181-87, 190-94; 3 J.H.W VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 60-65 (1970); Lewis M. Alexander, Baseline
Delimitations and Maritime Boundaries, 23 VA. J. INT'LL. 503 (1983); JosephW
Dellapenna, The Philippines Territorial Water Claim in International Law, 5 J.L.
& ECON. DEv 45 (1970).
"See BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 187-89; MCDOUGAL&BURKE, supra note
93, at 446-564.
"o See H. Gary Knight, International Legal Aspects of Deep Draft Harbor
Facilities, 4 . MAR. L. & COM. 367 (1973).
102 See GLOBALRESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: ENVIRONMENTAL
FACTORS IN STRATEGIC POLICY AND ACTION (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1986);
ROBERT MANDEL, CONFLICT OVER THE WORLD'S RESOURCES: BACKGROUND,
TRENDS, CASE STUDIES, AND CONSIDERATIONS FORTHE FUTURE (1988); Richard
B. Bilder, InternationalLaw andNaturalResources Policies, 20 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 451 (1980); Stefano Burchi, Shared Natural Resources in the European
Economic Community Legislation, 25 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 639 (1985); Ralph C.
d'Arge & Allen J. Kneese, State Liability for International Environmental
Degradation: AnEconomicPerspective, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 427 (1980); L.F.E.
Goldie, Equity and the International Management of Transboundary Resources,
25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 665 (1985).
103 See Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of
International Concern, Apr. 20, 1921, 7 L.N.TS 35 (entered into force Oct. 31,
1922); Venezuelan Preferential Case (Germany, Gr. Brit., Italy v Venez.) Hague
Ct. Rep. (Scott) 55 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1904); RICHARD R. BAXTER, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO INTEROCEANIC
CANALS (1964); BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 273-74; GEORGES KAECKENBEECK,
INTERNATIONAL RiVERS: A MONOGRAPH BASED ON DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
(1919); Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of
International Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 46-59 (1991) [hereinafter
Teclaff, Fiat or Custom].
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of water for irrigation and industrial uses has created occasional interna-
tional arbitrations over transboundary water resources,' °4 as well as
bilateral or regional agreements on managing such resources. °5 Together,
these changes have created a body of customary international law which
could be binding even on nations that have not formally accepted that
law "'The General Assembly of the UN recently approved the Convention
on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.!"7
1o See Lake Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain) (Arb. Tribunal Nov 16, 1957), in 53 AM. J.
INT'LL. 156 (1959); Case of the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Int'l Comm'n of the
Oder River, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23 at 27
105 See Act Regarding Navigation and Economic Co-operation between the
States of the Niger Basin, Oct. 26, 1963, 587 U.N.T.S. 9 [hereinafter Niamey
Treaty]; Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, India-Pak., 419 U.N.T.S. 126,
reproduced in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 797 (1961); Treaty Relating to the Utilization of
the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944,
U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219; General Convention Relating to the Development of
Hydraulic Power Affecting More Than One State, Dec. 9, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 76;
see also HERBERT A. SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS,
Appendix 1 (1931); TiyanjanaMaluwa, LegalAspects oftheNigerRiverunderthe
Niamey Treaties, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 671 (1988); C.O. Okidi, The State andthe
Management of International Drainage Basins in Africa, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J.
645 (1988); Symposium, U.S.-Canada Transboundary Resource Issues, 26 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 201 (1986); Albert Utton, The Transfer of Water from an
International Border Region: A Tale ofSix Cities and the Al American Canal, 16
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 477 (1991).
" See The Helsinla Rules, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE
FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE, Helsinki, 1966, at 484 (1967) (rules on the uses of
the waters of international rivers); BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 271-76; LuIS
VEIGA DA CUNHA ET AL., MANAGEMENT AND LAW FOR WATER RESOURCES 211-
24, 241-43 (1977); Teclaff, Fiat or Custom, supra note 103, at 59-73; Albert E.
Utton, International Waters, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 3 (Robert E. Beck
ed., 1991); see also Gretta Goldenman, Adapting to Climate Change: A Study of
InternationalRivers and TheirLegalArrangements, 17 ECOLOGYL.Q. 741 (1990);
Ernest T. Smerdon, Impact of Global Change on WaterResources, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 155 (1992); Ludwik A. Teclaff, The River Basin Concept and Global
Climate Change, 8 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 355 (1991) [hereinafter Teclaff, Global
Climate Change]. But see F.J. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-29
(1959). For similarproblems and solutions regarding transboundary oil and natural
gas deposits, see Alberto Szek6ly et al., Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources:
The Puerto Vallarta Draft Treaty, 31 NAT. RESOURCES 3. 609 (1991).
107 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/51/869, arts.
2(c), (4) (1997); see also Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Convention on the Law of Non-
[VOL. 88
LAW IN A SHRINKING WORLD
Even with the customary law and a UN Convention, however, no truly
contentious situation regarding internationally shared freshwaters can be
resolved except through a complex negotiated agreement.10 8 In contrast
with the considerable work done on surface water, the international
community has barely begun to recognize the need to coordinate the
management of transboundary aquifers.10 9
Moreover, the growing conflicts over the transfer of advanced
technology to developing nations are related to the emergence of resource
exploitation problems.1'0 As technological advances in some countries have
widened the economic gap between those countries and less developed
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 501
(1997); Stephen C. McCaffrey & Mpazi Sinjela, The 1997 United Nations
Convention on International Watercourses, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 97 (1998); Attila
Tanzi, The UN Convention on International Watercourses as a Frameworkfor the
Avoidance and Settlement ofWaterlawDisputes, 11 LEIDENJ. INT'LL.442 (1998).
108 See Joseph W Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for Managing Inter-
nationally-Shared Water Resources: Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of
Property, 26 CASE W. RES. I. INT'L L. 27 (1994); Joseph W Dellapenna, Water in
the Jordan Valley: The Potential and Limits ofLaw, 5 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 15
(1989) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Jordan Valley].
109 See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION: REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND
CONFERENCE 21, 231-85 (1986); Ann Berkley Rodgers & Albert E. Utton, The
Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters, in
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 151 (Albert E. Utton & Ludwik A. Teclaff
eds., 1987); LuDWiK A. TECLAFF & ALBERT E. UTTON, INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW (1981); Julio Barberis, The Development of International
Law ofTransboundary Groundwater, 31 NAT.RESOURCESJ. 167 (1991); J.Roman
Calleros, The Impact on Mexico of the Lining of the All-American Canal, 31 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 829 (1991); Douglas Hayes, TheAll-Amencan CanalLiningProject:
A Catalyst for Rational and Comprehensive Groundwater Management on the
United States-Mexico Border, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803 (1991); Robert D.
Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft
Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663 (1989); see also Ray Jay Davis, Atmospheric
Water Resources Development and International Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 11
(1991).
110 See KRISHNA R. DRONAMRAJU, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY SHARING (1998); Nicholas A. Ashford & Chrstine Ayers, Policy
Issues for Consideration in Transfemng Technology to Developing Countries, 12
ECOLOGY L.Q. 871 (1985); Pierre V.F Bos & Marco M. Slotboom, The EC
Technology Transfer Regulation-A Practitioner's Perspective, 32 INT'L LAW. 1
(1998); Stevan M. Pepa, Note, International Trade and Emerging Genetic
Regulatory Regimes, 29 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 415 (1998).
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countries, the international community has introduced special provisions
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to promote economic
development." At the same time, it has been necessary, but far from easy,
to develop international regulatory regimes for multinational
corporations.' 2 The converse of this has been the need to perfect national
and international protection for intellectual property 11
" See also Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guaranty
Agency, Oct. 11, 1985,24 I.L.M. 1598; Charter ofEconomic Rights andDuties of
States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9946
(1975); Declaration on the Establishment ofa New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to
Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development, Feb. 8, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1977. See
generally William E. Holder, International Economic Relations, 14 YALE J. INT'L
L. 565 (1989); Yao Meizhen, Legal Protection of International Investment, in
SELECTED ARTICLES, supra note 31, at 147
'1 See 1985 Report of Work on the Formulation of the United Nations Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Centre on Transnat'l Corps., U.N.
Doc. E/C. 10/1985/S/2 (1985); OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 967
3 See Berne Convention, supra note 76; Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note
76; ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION?: FROM PRIVACY TO
PUBLIC ACCESS (1994); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (1994); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995); Keith Aoki, Considering
Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National
Sovereignty, "Global" Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 443 (1998); Keith Aoka, antellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
Notes Towarda Cultural Geography ofAuthorship, 48 STAN. L. REV 1293 (1996);
Harold J. Bordwm, The Legal and Political Implications of the International
Undertalang on Plant Genetic Resources, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1053 (1985); Michael
Bothe, Transborder Data Flows: Do We Mean Freedom or Business?, 10 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 333 (1989); Jack E. Brown, The Protection of High Technology
IntellectualProperty: An InternationalPerspective, 7 COMPUTERLAW. 17 (1990);
Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rulesfor Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV 121 (1999); Dan
L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global
ComputerNetworks, 68 TUL.L.REv 1(1993); SteveP Calandrillo, An Economic
Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of
Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a
Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
301 (1998); Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay
Round-Negotiating Strategies ofthe Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH.
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3. INT'L L. 1317 (1990); Jay A. Erstling, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
and Its Impact on the International Protection of Chip Designs, 15 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 303 (1989); Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial
Rights: Private International Law Questions of the Global Information
Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 318 (1995); I. Trotter Hardy,
Computer RAM "Copies " Hit or a Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching as
a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV 423 (1997);
Dennis S. Karjala, UnitedStatesAdherence to theBerne Convention and Copyright
Protection of Information-Based Technologies, 28 JURIMETRICS 147 (1988);
William J. Keating, The European Community-1992 and Beyond: The
Implications of a Single Europe on Intellectual Property, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 53
(1991); ClarkW. Lackert, InternationalEffortsAgainst Trademark Counterfeiting,
1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV 161, Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States
IntellectualPropertyAbroad TowardaNewMultilateralism, 76 IOWA L.REv. 273
(1991); Mark A. Lemley, Dealingwith Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22
U. DAYTON L. REV 547 (1997); Andr6 Lucas, Copyright in the European
Community: The Green Paper and the Proposalfor a Directive Concerning Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 145 (1991);
Charles R. McMams, Talang TRIPS on the Information Superhighway:
International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer
Technology, 41 VILL. L. REV 207 (1996); Michael S. Mensik, Software
Localization: Hidden Issues that Arise when Software Is Translated Abroad, 8
COMPUTER LAW. 1 (1991); Andreas P Remdl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace:
Copyright Conflicts on GlobalNetworks, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 799 (1998); Pamela
Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997);
Raimund Sterner & Robert P Sabath, Intellectual Property and Trade Law
Approaches to Gray Market Importation, and the Restructuring of Transnational
Entities to PermitBlockage ofGray Goods in the United States, 15 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV 433 (1989); Symposium, TheBerne Convention, 3 J.L. &TECH. 1 (1988);
Symposium, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 223 (1989); Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual
Property Rights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
173 (1998); Victor Vandebeek, Realizing the European Community Common
Market by Unifying Intellectual Property Law: Deadline 1992, 1990 BYU L. REV
1605; James R. Warnot, Jr., Software Copyright Protection in the European
Community: Existing Law and an Analysis of the Proposed Council Directive, 6
SANTA CLARA COMPUTERS & HIGH TECH. L.J. 355 (1991); Jo Dale Carothers,
Note, Protection oflntellectual Property on the World Wide Web: Is the Digital
Millennium CopyrightAct Sufficient?, 41 ARIZ. L. REV 937 (1999); Benjamin 1L
Kuhn, Comment, A Dilemma in Cyberspace and Beyond: Copyright Law for
Intellectual Property Distributed over the Information Superhighway ofToday and
Tomorrow, 10 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 171 (1996); Matthew J. McDonough,
Note, MoralRights andMovies: The Threat and Challenge ofthe Digital Domain,
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As the prior summary of problems relating to resource management
suggests, almost any problem of environmental management today has an
international dimension." 4 The international community has recently
recognized that international dimension of even such apparently localized
activities as the preservation of biodiversity 115 The all-encompassing
31 SUFF U. L. REV 455 (1997); Brandon K. Murai, Comment, Online Service
Providers and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Are Copyright Owners
Adequately Protected, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV 285 (1999).
114 See HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND PRINCIPLES
OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994); Sanford E. Games,
Taking Responsibility for Transboundary Environmental Effects, 14 HASTINGS
INT'L& COMP. L. REv 781 (1991); Lawrence A. Herzog, InternationalBoundary
Cities: The Debate on Transfrontier Planning in Two Border Regions, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 587 (1991); Alexander Kiss, The Protection of the Rhine against
Pollution, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 613 (1985); Harold Craig Manson, The Impact
of International Outer Space Commerce on the Environment, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J.
541 (1991); Nancy Maynard, Science: The Basis for Action on Global Change, 9
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 35 (1992); Thayer Scudder, The Need and Justification
for Maintaining Transboundary Flood Regimes: The Africa Case, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 75 (1991); Linda M. Sheehan, The EEC's Proposed Directive on
Civil Liabilityfor Dam age Caused by Waste: Taking over When Prevention Fails,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 405 (1991); Symposium, The Politics of the Global
Environment, 44 J. INT'L AFF 287 (1991); Ludwik A. Teclaff, Treaty Practice
Relating to Transboundary Flooding, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 109 (1991); Ludwik
A. Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Transboundary Toxic Pollution and the Drainage
Basin Concept, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 589 (1985); Patrick E. Thieffry & Peter E.
Nahmias, The European Community's Regulation and Control of Waste and the
Adoption of Civil Liability, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV 949 (1991);
Alexandre S. Timoshenko, TheProblem ofPreventingDamage to the Environment
in National and International Law: Impact Assessment and International
Consultations, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. REV 475 (1988); Alexandre S. Timoshenko,
Protection of Wetlands by InternationalLaw, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. REV 463 (1988);
Kathleen Howard, Note, The Basel Convention: Control of Transboundary
Movement ofHazardous Wastes and TheirDisposal, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP
L.REV 223 (1991).
"s See Convention on BiologicalDiversity, June 5, 1992, reprnted in 31 I.L.M.
818; JEFFREY A. MCNEELY ET AL., CONSERVING THE WORLD'S BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY (1990); David J. Bederman, International Control of Marine
"Pollution " by Exotic Species, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677 (1991); M.J. Bowman, The
Protection ofAnimals Under International Law, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 487 (1989);
Gary D. Meyers, Surveying the Lay of the Land, Air, and Water- Features of
Current International Environmental and Natural Resources Law, and Future
Prospects for the Protection of Species Habitat to Preserve Global Biological
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problem of global warming is the most pervasive problem and is irrefutable
proof of the inherently international nature of such issues. Global warming
will affect the well-being of the entire planet, altering the climate with
unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences, 16 as well as
raising sea levels and distorting riparian patterns with disastrous results for
both rural and urban dwellers." 7 Because of.the potentially serious
consequences, the threat of global warming has led nations to adopt
measures to regulate or suppress some of the most salient causes of global
warming, particularly chlorofluorocarbons.'
8
Diversity, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 479 (1992); William M. Flevares,
Note, Ecosystems, Economics, andEthics: ProtectingBiologicalDiversity at Home
andAbroad, 65 S. CAL. L. REV 2039 (1992).
'16 See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Robm Churchill
& David Freestone eds., 1991); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of Water
Management to Global Climate Change and Other Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 J.
AM. WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 1301 (1999); Goldenman, supra note 106;
Lakshman Guruswamy, Global Warming: Integrating United States and
International Law, 32 ARIZ. L. REV 221 (1990); Smerdon, supra note 106;
ChnstopherD. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" against Global Warming, 86 AM.
I. INT'LL. 445 (1992); Symposium, Energy andEnvironment: Intersecting Global
Issues, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP L. 1 (1992); Symposium, Global Climatic
Change, 10 DEN. J. INT'LL. &POL'Y463 (1981); Teclaff, Global Climate Change,
supra note 106.
"' See David D. Caron, When Law Makes Climate Change Worse: Rethinking
the Law ofBaselines in Light ofa Rising Sea Level, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 621 (1990);
Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, "Half Seas Over" The Impact of Sea Level Rise on
InternationalLaw and Policy, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175 (1991); Joseph
L. Sax, The Fate of Wetlands in the Face of Rising Sea Levels: A Strategic
Proposal, 9 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 143 (1991).
"'See UnitedNations Conference onEnvironmentalandDevelopment: Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Intergovernment Negotiating Comm., 5th
Sess., pt. 2 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone, Sept. 16, 1987,26 I.L.M. 1541, Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 99-9 (1985); see also
David D. Caron, Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of
InternationalEnvironmentalLawmalang, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV 755
(1991); Susan E. Holley, Global Warming: Construction and Enforcement of an
International Accord, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 44 (1991); Joel A. Mintz, Keeping
Pandora 'sBoxShut: A CriticalAssessment ofthe Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv 565 (1989); Ved
P Nanda, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A Challenge for International
Environmental Law and Policy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 482 (1989); Steven J.
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For few other areas of environmental management, however, has
international response progressed beyond high-sounding declarations" 9 to
practical and enforceable measures of international cooperation.'20 All too
Shtmberg, Stratospheric Ozone and ClimateProtection: Domestic Legislation and
the International Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 2175 (1991); Pamela Wexler, Protecting
the Global Atmosphere: Beyond the Montreal Protocol, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 1 (1990); Jason M. Patlis, Note, The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal
Protocol: A Prototype for Financial Mechanisms in Protecting the Global
Environment, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 181 (1992).
"9 See Report of-the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416; see also VEIR
KOESTER, THE RAMSAR CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF WETLANDS: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION
IN DENMARK (1989); INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW" PRIMARY
MATERIALS 1-111 (Michael R. Molitor ed., 1991) [hereinafter PRIMARY
MATERIALS]; Dominique Alheritiere, Settlement ofPublic International Disputes
on Shared Resources: Elements of a Comparative Study of International
Instruments, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701 (1985); Caldwell, supra note 15; James
Cameron & JuliAbouchar, ThePrecautionaryPnnciple:AFundamentalPnnciple
ofLaw and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L &
COMP.L.REv 1 (1991); David D. Caron, The Law oftheEnvironment: A Symbolic
Step ofModest Value, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 528 (1989); Pierre-Mane Dupuy, Soft
Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420
(1991); Richard A. Falk, Toward a World Order Respectful of the Global
Ecosystem, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV 711 (1992); MarkAllan Gray, The United
Nations EnvironmentProgramme: An Assessment, 20 ENVTL. L. 291 (1990); Ellen
Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law:
Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. L. REV 303 (1992);
David B. Hunter, Toward Global Citizenship in International EnvironmentalLaw,
28 WILLAMETTE L. REV 547 (1992); Alexandre S. Timoshenko, International
Environmental Law: Fundamental Aspects, 59 REVISTA JURIDICA U.P.I. 653
(1990).
120 See PRIMARYMATERIALS,supra note 119, at 113-571; STANLEYP. JOHNSON
& GUY CORCELLE, THE ENvIRONMENTALPOLICY OFTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(1989); Sanford E. Games, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity
to Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463 (1991); R.J.A. Goodland, The
World Bank's EnvironmentalAssessment Policy, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L.
REV 811 (1991); Ursula Kettlewell, The Answer to Global Pollution? A Critical
Examination ofthe Problems andPotential ofthe Polluter-Pays Principle, 3 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 429 (1992); A.V. Leont'eva, Cooperation of Socialist
Countries in Environmental Protection, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1989); Frangois
A. Mathys, International Environmental Law: A Canadian Perspective, 3 PACE
Y.B. INT'L L. 91 (1991); Bernard H. Oxman, The Duty to Respect Generally
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often, the available "hard law" is not enforced or effective even when it
exists. 12'
One can lookto the Mediterranean, a shallow enclosed sea particularly
vulnerable to environmental abuse, as a particularly clear example of the
mounting international problems. In this century, the Mediterranean has
been despoiled by nearly every coastal state and, despite high-sounding
agreements to protect the sea, continues to deteriorate with little being done
to correct the situation."z Even less has been done regarding pollution of
less vulnerable seas."
The same high-sounding declarations coupled with largely inadequate
implementation also pertain to the emerging international law of human
Accepted International Standards, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109 (1991);
Amedeo Postiglione, A More Efficient International Law on the Environment and
Setting Up an International Courtfor the Environment within the United Nations,
20 ENVTL. L. 321 (1990); Report of the Working Group of Experts from the
Member States on the Use of Economic and Fiscal Instruments in EC
Environmental Policy, 14 B.C. INT'L&CoMP.L.REv 447 (1991); Peter M. Sand,
Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF L.
REV 213 (1991); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and the Environment: A
Legal Perspective, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1992); Stone, supra note 116;
Jeff Trask, Note, Montreal Protocol Noncompliance Procedure: The Best
Approach to ResolvingInternationalEnvironmentalDisputes?, 80 GEO. L.J. 1973
(1992).
121 See Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Recognizing and Countervailing Environ-
mental Subsidies, 26 INT'L LAW 763 (1992) (arguing that a nation that fails
to compel its industries to internalize the costs of their pollution is thereby
subsidizing the offending industry which should make the industry subject to
countervailing duties under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and U.S.
law).
'1 See PETER HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (1990); Aldo E. Chtrcop, The
Mediterranean Sea and the Quest for Sustainable Development, 23 OCEAN DEV
&INT'LL. 17 (1992).
" See Matthew R. Auer, Prospects for Environmental Cooperation in the
Yellow Sea, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV 163 (1991); Alan E. Boyle, Marine Pollution
under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 347 (1985); William L.
Schachte, Jr., The Value of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Preserving our Freedoms and Protecting the Environment, 23 OCEAN DEV &
INT'LL. 55 (1992); LudwikA. Teclaff& Eileen Teclaff, Transfers ofPollution and
theMarneEnvironment Conventions, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 187 (1991); Yvonne
Tharpes, International EnvironmentalLaw: Turning the Tide on Marine Pollution,
20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV 579 (1989).
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
rights." In fact, one certain indication that the appeal for international
action to protect the environment involves little more than dramatic
declarations is the couching of it m terms of a supposed "human right to an
appropriate environment."'25 Both protecting the environment and
promoting respect for human rights have, thus far, simply foundered on the
continuing failure of the proponents of those norms to resolve the related
problems of respecting cultural diversity and promoting a more uniform
economic development among the nations of the world, as much as on
selfish nationalism.
26
124 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6
I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976); Convention on the Prevention of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (1948),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES, at 5 (1983);
see also BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 553-602; JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INTHEORYANDPRACTICE (1989); JANIS, supra note 28, at 249-80;
HERCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONALLAWAND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950);MYRES
S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980); FRANKNEWMAN
& DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCESS (1990); Lea Brilmayer, InternationalRemedies, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 579
(1989); A. Belden Fields & Wolf-DieterNarr, HumanRights as aHolistic Concept,
14 HUM.RTS. Q. 1 (1992); Louis Henkin, InternationalHumanRights as "Rights, "
1 CARDOZO L.REV 425 (1980); Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HUM. RTS.
Q. 368 (1991); Theo Van Boven, The Role ofthe United Nations Secretariat in the
Area ofHuman Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &POL. 69 (1991).
125 Iveta Hodkova, Is There a Right to a Healthy Environment in the Inter-
nationalLegal Order?, 7 CONN. J.INT'LL. 65, 123 (199 1); see also Dinah Shelton,
Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 103 (1991); Janusz Symonides, The Human Right to a Clean, Balanced
and Protected Environment, 20 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 24, 34 (1992); Vid
Vukasovic, Protection of Environment: One of the Key Issues in the Field of
Human Rights, 59 REVISTA JURIDICA U.P.R. 889 (1990).
126 See J. RONALD ENGEL & JOAN GIBB ENGEL, ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGE, INTERNATIONALRESPONSE (1990); MICHAEL
RADCLIFF, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORING THE CONTRADICTIONS
(1991 ); Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Extending the Frontiers of
Innovative Financing in Support of the Global Environment, 25 INT'L LAW 557
(1991); Beifing Declaration on Environment, Development, BEIJING REV., July 8,
1991, at 10; Chen, supra note 29; Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus
Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful Standards, 27 STAN.
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Finally, one can never overlook the inpact of the changes m our ability
to exert control over procreation, disease, and death. 27 While such
developments have been dealt with mostly on the national level, it has
already been noted that such activities, if they are to be regulated at all,
must be regulated internationally " If even one nation breaks ranks with
a generally accepted approach to regulating biomedical research and
application, then those who wish to pursue such research or applications
will gravitate to that nation. We will see a sort of "Gresham's law" in
which "bad" regulatory regimes will drive out "good" regulatory
regimes.
1 29
J. INT'L L. 345 (1991); Jennifer Drogula, Developed and Developing Countries:
Sharing the Burden of Protecting the Atmosphere, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV
257 (1992); Karen A. Goldberg, Efforts to Prevent Misuse ofPesticides Exported
to Developing Countries: Progressing Beyond Regulation and Notification, 12
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1025 (1985); Raymond Hill, Problems and Policy for Pesticide
Exports to Less Developed Countries, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 699 (1988); John
Horberry, The Accountability of Development Assistance Agencies: The Case of
Environmental Policy, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 817 (1985); Robert Houseman, The
Muted Voice: The Role of Women in Sustainable Development, 4- GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV 361 (1992); Ronnie D. Lipshutz, Wasn't the Future Wonderful?
Resources, Environment, and the Emerging Myth of Global Sustainable
Development, 2 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 35 (1991); Daniel Barstow
Magraw, Legal Treatment ofDeveloping Countries: Differential, Contextual, and
Absolute Norms, 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 69 (1990); Ved P Nanda,
International Environmental Protection andDeveloping Countries 'Interests: The
Role oflnternationalLaw, 26 TEx. INT'LL.J.497 (1991); John O'Manque, Human
Rights and Development, 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 78 (1992); Bruce M. Rich, The
MultilateralDevelopment Banks, Environmental Policy, and the United States, 12
ECOLOGY L.Q. 681 (1985); Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as an
Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1983); Robert Saunders, Is It
Economically Viable for Developing Countries to Cut Down Carbon Dioxide
Emissions?, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP L. 205 (1992); William Wilson,
EnvironmentalLaw as DevelopmentAssistance, 22 ENVTL. L. 953 (1992); Harold
Wood, Jr., The UnitedNations World CharterforNature: The Developng Nations'
Initiative to Establish Protections for the Environment, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 977
(1985).
'
27 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Melissa Cantrell, InternationalResponse to Dolly: Will Scientific
Freedom Get Sheared?, 13 J. L. &HEALTH 68 (1998).
29 "Gresham's law," formulated by Thomas Gresham m the sixteenth century,
holds that if more than one specie of currency is circulating m a society, people will
hoard the more valuable specie and spend the less valuable specie; m short, "bad




As the foregoing summary suggests, the influence of science and
technology on the ends pursued by international law has been pervasive,
posing new problems or exacerbating old problems that transcend national
boundaries. In principle, science and technology should provide the means
for solving problems confronting international lawyers. This sometimes
happens by making steps practical that were previously impractical. I have
already described how the dramatic changes in the law of the sea reflected
as much the new technologies enabling effective surveillance and
enforcement of enlarged coastal state authority as they did new interests m
coastal margins---if two hundred or more miles from the coast can be
considered a margin. 130 Broad assertions of coastal-state authority over
large expanses of water have occurred for centuries,' but without any
means for making such claims effective.' Only within the past twenty-five
years have the necessary means existed."'
Another long-standing problem has beenthe possibility ofarepresenta-
tive of a nation exceeding the authority delegated to that representative.134
While technology has not entirely eliminated this problem, the abilities of
the sending state to keep abreast of negotiations and of the receiving state
to verify the diplomat or other agent's authority should a question
regarding that authority arise have greatly ameliorated the problem. These
changes are entirely a function of modem communications technology A
similar transformation might be impending regarding patents and copy-
rights as we develop the technology to store data holographi-
cally-including models of what is protected by the legal right. 35
WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT 10 (1975). By extension, it stands for the
proposition that an inferior product, m a particular setting, will displace a superior
product. See D.A.F., Gresham's Law of Legal Commentary, 3 CONST.
COMMENTARY 307 (1986).
130 See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
131 See JOHN SELDEN, OF THE DOMINION: OR OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA (reprint
ed. 1979) (1635); WILLIAM WELWOOD, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF ALL SEA-LAWES
(1613).
132 See HUGO DE GROOT (GROTIUS), MARE LIBERUM (1633); see also
CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARis DISSERTATIO (reprint ed.
1923) (1702). See generally Daniel Wilkes, The Use of World Resources Without
Conflict. Myths about the Territorial Sea, 14 WAYNE L. REV 441 (1968).
13 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
" See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5).
131 See Patti Burshtyn, Note, Illuminating the Law of Copyright: Holographic
Data Storage Takes Intellectual Property to a New Dimension, 9 FORDHAM
[VOL. 88
LAW IN A SHRINKING WORLD
Unfortunately, alterations of the means whereby international law
functions are far less pervasive than the creation of new problems or the
exacerbation of old ones. Often, the only solution is to ban the technology
m question, 36 yet prohibition of a product or process must await the
development of effective means to detect violations of the prohibition.
Again, nuclear devices provide the most dramatic examples. It is no
accident that three nuclear powers agreed nearly thirty years ago not to
conduct nuclear tests m the atmosphere,'3 7 where the tests are easily
detectable, while neither they nor other interested nations have effectively
banned underground nuclear tests. Similarly, the United States and the
Soviet Umon agreed early on to limit the development and deployment of
anti-ballistic missile systems because such systems could not be tested
without detection.'38 Agreements to control the proliferation of nuclear
weapons are still bedeviled by the mability to detect violations.139 Indeed,
Soviet-American agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals only became
possible when satellite and other surveillance techniques made the risk of
cheating small enough to justify the agreement.'"
Enforceability also presents a serious challenge to the effectiveness of
many environmental management treaties. Consider, for example, how one
will trace violations of the ban on chlorofluorocarbons by the Montreal
INTELL.PROP. MEDIA&ENT.L.J. 361 (1998); MarkHalperPuttingMountEverest
into an Anthill, FORBES, July 7, 1997, at 208.
,16 See supra note 118 (sources discussing the banning of chlorofluorocarbon
technologies).
137 See supra note 78.
1 See ABM Treaty, supra note 79. Subsequent technical developments have
unstabilized this treaty as the United States has changed its interpretation of the
meaning of the test-ban aspects of the treaty while the Soviet Union insisted on the
earlier interpretation. See also FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 383-91 (1989); David
Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms
Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REv 1353 (1989); Detlev F Vagts, Senate
Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hintsfor the Supreme Court,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1989).
139 See supra note 79.
140 See Agreement on Principles of Implementing Trial Verification and Stabi-
lity Measures That Would Be Carried Out Pending the Conclusion of the U.S.-
Soviet Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, United
States-USSR, Sept. 23, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1434; Treaty on the Elimination of




Protocol."' The problem of detection is so pervasive m the environmental
field that entire books have been written on the problem."
The nuclear weapons examples illustrate a different problem m relymg
on technology to solve international (or other) legal problems. Solutions
depend not only on the existence of appropriate technology, but also on the
political willingness of the necessary actors to employ that technology
effectively Thus, the nuclear proliferation and disarmament treaties have
never included certain major nuclear powers who, for reasons sufficient to
themselves, have neverjomed (or have never been asked to jom) the treaty
even though the surveillance technology wouldbe equally effective applied
to, or by, the absent states. Similarly, treaties addressing the highjacking or
sabotage of civilian aircraft have always suffered from the refusal of
certain key states to adhere to the agreements.143
Arguably, the most far-reaching consequence of many modem
technologies working in tandem has been the obsolescence of national
sovereignty, at least for states with less than several hundred million
people.1" Even in such relatively localized questions as steps to protect
children from exposure to pornography or molestation, we find that the
problem is global and cannot be dealt with adequately at the national or
local level.145 In fact, crime of all types is becoming globalized, seriously
141 See supra note 118.
142 See LYNNE M. JURGIELEWICZ, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE LEGAL ORDER (1996);
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A
SURVEYOFEXISTINGLEGALINSTRUMENTS 437 (PeterH. Sand ed., 1992); see also
Damel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1999);
Holley, supra note 118.
' See supra note 84.
See supra note 15.
See Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998); Reno v ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding parts of the Communications Decency Act as
unconstitutional); see also JeffMagenau, SettingRules in Cyberspace: Congress's
Lost Opportunities to Avoid the Vagueness and Overbreadth of the
CommunicationsDecencyAct,34SANDIEGOL.REv 1111 (1997); Robert O'Neill,
Free Speech on the Internet: Beyond "Indecency, " 38 JURIMETRICS 617 (1998);
Jumchi P Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filterng
Software vs. The First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REV 509 (2000); Symposium,
Emerging Media Technology and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1019
(1995); Vikas Arora, Note, The Communications Decency Act: Congressional
Repudiation of the "Right Stuff, " 34 HARv J. ON LEGIS. 473 (1997); Robert F
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undermining the idea of police work as a local or even as a national
activity 16 Similar problems are encountered with attempts to regulate the
behavior of lawyers acting at a distance through the Internet. 47 The
increasing Inability of nation-states to cope with the problems facing a
globalizmg society probably accounts for the emergence of regional
groupings, such as the European Umon, that appear to be gradually
coalescing into entities capable of exercising sovereign powers to resolve
regional problems. 4 Yet the disintegration offormerlyunified states, often
Goldman, Note, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill on the Internet: The
Effect ofApplying CurrentAnti-ObscenityLaws to Online Communications, 29 GA.
L. REV 1075 (1995); Jill Jacobson, Comment, The Child Online Protection Act:
Congress's Latest Attempt to Regulate Speech on the Internet, 40 SANTA CLARA
L. REV 221 (1999); Phillip E. Lewis, Comment, A Brief Comment on the
Application of the "Contemporary Community Standard" to the Internet, 22
CAMPBELL L. REv 143 (1999).
146 See Raymond Bonner, F.B.I. Going to Budapest to Hunt the Mob, N.Y
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000, at A6 (reporting the opening of an FBI office in Budapest
after the Hungarian government agreed that the officers would have authority to
carry weapons and to make arrests). See generally Roger S. Clark, Crime: The UN
Agenda on International Cooperation in the Criminal Process, 15 NOVA L. REV
475 (1991); William N. Gianans, The New World Order and the Need for an
International Criminal Court, 16 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 88 (1992); Sandra L.
Jamison,A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes
Past Objections, 23 DEN. J. INT'LL. &POL'Y419 (1995); Paul D. Marquardt, Law
Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (1995); Fazia Patel, Crime Without Frontiers: A
Proposalfor an International Narcotics Court, 22 N.Y.U. 3. INT'L L. & POL. 709
(1990).
147 SeeBrian G. Gilpm, Comment, Attorney Advertising and Solicitation on the
Internet: Complying with Ethics Regulations and Netiquette, 13 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 697 (1995); Natacha 0. Stenner, Note, Cyberlaw: Legal
Malpractice in the Age of Online Lawyers, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV 332 (1995);
DanelB. Kennedy, PCPractitioners Proliferate, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 36; Ohio
Lawyer May Render Legal Advice Through Law Firm's World Wide Web Site, 68
U.S.L.W. 2388 (Jan. 11,2000); Rosalind Resnick,A Shingle in Cyberspace, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at 1.
148 See FREDERICK M. ABBOTr, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
THE NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION SYSTEM (1995); DANIEL JUDAH ELAZAR, CONSTITUTIONALIZING
GLOBALIZATION: THE POSTMODERN REvIVAL OF CONFEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS
(1998); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (4th ed. 1998); TOWARDS A EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY-
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with considerable bloodshed, demonstrates that political will can and does
prevail over the apparent dictates of technology, even m quite small areas,
as the problems m Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, and the former
Soviet Umon have demonstrated.
1 49
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, &POLTICALDIMENSiONs (Johan K. De Vree et al. eds., 1987);
Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, Building the Union: The Nature of
Sovereignty in the PoliticalArchitecture ofEurope?, 16 LAW & PHIL. 421 (1997);
Marta Hames-Ferran, MERCOSUR: A New Model of Latin American Economic
Integration?, 25 CASE W RES. J. INT'L L. 413 (1993); Colin L. McCarthy,
Regional Integration of Developing Countries at Different Levels of Economic
Development-Problems and Prospects, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP PROBS. 1
(1994); Danmel T. Murphy, European Political Cooperation after the Single
European Act: The Future of Foreign Affairs in the European Communities, 12
B.C. INT'L & COMP L. REV 335 (1989); Horacio Gngera Naon, Sovereignty and
Regionalism, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1073 (1996); Catherine Richmond,
Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European
Law, 16 LAW & PHIL. 377 (1997); Martin Rudner, Institutional Approaches to
Regional Trade and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Area, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP PROBS. 159 (1994); Roger Cohen, A European Identity: Nation-State
Losing Ground, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 14, 2000, at A3.
149 See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1998); U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN
TROUBLE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Wolfgang
Biermann & Martin Vadset eds., 1998); Zaure Ayupova, The Republic of
Kazakhstan: Six Years oflndependent Development, 6 TULSAJ. COMP &INT'LL.
65 (1998); Stephen Dycus, Quebec Independence and United States Security: A
Question of Continuing Rights and Duties, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP L. 187
(1998); Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Expert for Chechnya: Purposes and
Prospects in Light oflnternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'LL. 115 (1999); Thomas D.
Grant, Comment, Territorial Status, Recognition, and Statehood: Some Aspects of
the Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 33 STAN. J. INT'L L.
305 (1997); Michael C. Hudson, The Breakdown ofDemocracy in Lebanon, 38 J.
INT'L AFF 277 (1985); Sergei Khabarov, Introductory Note, 34 I.L.M. 1298
(1995); Martti Koskenmemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV J. INT'L L. 397
(1991); Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future of Asylum Law,
71 U. COLO. L. REV 3 (2000); Roger Myers, A New RemedyforNorthern Ireland:
The Casefor UnitedNations Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP L. 1 (1990); Babak Nikravesh, Quebec and
Tatarstan in InternationalLaw, 23 FLETCHERF WORLDAFF- 227 (Winter-Spring
1999); Sandra M. Saseen, The TaifAccord and Lebanon's Struggle to Regain Its
Sovereignty, 6 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 57 (1990); Michael P Scharf, Musical
Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United Nations, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29 (1995); Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage
Resultingfrom the NATO MilitaryAction against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J.ENTVL.
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I. THE STRUCTURAL ALTERATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES
International law long seemed relatively immune to the "deconstruc-
tion" that has become fashionable m certain circles of academic
lawyermg.5° International law and international legal processes largely
escaped the "postmodermst" scrutiny because they were always less
wedded to positivist notions of law that characterized the "modernist"
vision of society 1 5' This exemption from the postmodernist critique has
now ended, postmodermism has begun to appearm analyses of international
law 152 It is as true for international law as for other forms of law that "[i]n
L. 117 (2000); Symposium, Rethinlang Nationalism and Sovereignty, supra note
15; Gregg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the
International Criminal Court, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 89 (2000); Sergei Vinogradov,
Transboundary Water Resources in the Former Soviet Union: Between Conflict
and Cooperation, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 393 (1996).
See supra notes 39-70 and accompanying text.
's, See CARTY, supra note 28, at 95-101, see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); Kenneth W Abbott, Modern
InternationalRelations Theory: A ProspectusforInternationalLawsyers, 14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of
International Law, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 79 (1971); Douglas M. Johnston,
Functionalism in the Theory oflnternationalLaw, 26 CAN. Y.B. INT'LL. 3 (1988);
Robert MacLean, DoesAnyone StillAsk the Question "Is InternationalLawReally
Law?", 1991 JURIDICALREV.,Pt 2, at 230; James Brown Scott, The LegalNature
ofInternationalLaw, 1 AM.J. INT'LL. 831 (1907); Alfred Verdross, LeFondement
du droit International, 16 RECUEIL DES COUPS 251 (1927).
152 See CARTY, supra note 28; DE LUPIS, supra note 29; DAVID KENNEDY,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURE (1987); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA. THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT
(1989); FRIEDRICH V KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE
CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGALREASONING IN INTERNATIONALRELATIONS
AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (1989); NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, WORLD OF OUR
MAKING: RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1989); James Boyle, Ideals and Things: InternationalLegal Scholarship and the
Prison-house ofLanguage, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327 (1985); Ian Johnstone, Treaty
Interpretation: TheAuthority oflnterpretive Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT'LL. 371
(1991); Joel1R. Paul, The New Movements in InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 607 (1995); Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public
InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81 (1991); Daniel K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth,
and the InternationalEconomic Order, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 533 (1985); Phillip R.
Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L.
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a period of rapid change, the older theories of legal legitimacy [sic], the
meta-human theories, cannot sustain themselves." ' As a result, interna-
tional law and international legal processes, as intellectual structures, are
now open to question in a way that they were not open before. How
scientific theory and technological applications affect an intellectual
structure like law remains far from clear, except perhaps after the fact. The
snuplistic Marxian notion of "law as superstructure," with no reciprocal
effect on the social structures reflected m the law, can no longer be
maintained. s4 Nor can one simply accept the Webenan notion that law (and
other ideological constructs) creates the material society within which the
law functions.'55 Law both affects and reflects changes m the society which
it governs, by legitimating changes in certain (not always foreseen)
directions and by recogmzmg as legitimate changes that have already
occurred.
The most fundamental changes in society can be expected to bring
about the most fundamental changes m law, even acknowledging the
effects of law in channeling or otherwise controlling such changes. For
example, the invention of clear glass in thirteenth-century Italy led to glass
REV 811 (1990); G. Webb, Symbols and Ideas-Rules, Guidelines and
InternationalLaw, 14 VICTORiAUNIV WELLINGTONL. REV. 389 (1984); Kenneth
L. Wise, Social Science and Global Law, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV 1355 (1981);
Jason Mark Anderman, Note, Swimming the New Stream: The Disjunctions
Between and Within Popular and Academic International Law, 6 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 293 (1996); see also Gianter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-
thinlang Comparative Law, 26 HARV INT'L L.J. 411 (1985).
153 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY,
AND CULTURE 53 (1990).
154 See KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM (reprinted 1987)
(1875). Compare P.I. STUCKA, THE OVERTHROW OF LAW (1919), with KARL
RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
(1929). See also Li Buyun, Certain Questions Concerning the Relationship
between Party Policies and State Laws, 3 FAXUEJIKAN3 (July 1984) (in Chinese);
Wu Jianfan, Building New China's Legal System, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(1983); see generally MAUREEN CAIN & ALAN HUNT, MARXANDENGELS ON LAW
(1979); Alice Erh-Soon Tay & Eugene Kainenka, Marxism, Socialism and the
Theory ofLaw, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217 (1985).
1s5 See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed.
& Edward Shils trans., 2d ed. 1954); MAX WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
(Ephraim Fischofftrans., 4th ed. 1963) (1922); see also J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL
SOFTWARE: ATHEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998); REINHARDBENDIX, MAXWEBER: AN
INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT (1960); PETER STEIN & JOHN SHAND, LEGAL VALUES IN
WESTERN SOCIETY (1974).
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windows which not only radically altered Western painting (frames and
perspectives) but also distancedthe viewer from the view This transformed
the way Europeans (and eventually all people) related to the world. 56
Similarly, the perfection ofmechamcal clocks m medieval monasteries (as
a means of assuring timely prayers) revolutionized the way we structure
time, eventually leading to the assembly line and modem science. 157 For
law, such changes were profound; even more immediately profound were
the transitions m the medium whereby lawyers function, from oral law to
scribal law to printed law 15 Today, we face the transition to electromc
media, producing what some have termed "paratexts," which again could
revolutiomze the very intellectual structure of law 159
International law is, in some ways, a problematic discipline. Interna-
tional law and its processes are a decentralized and highly informal system,
one that can fairly be described as primitive."6 By the word "primitive," I
(and presumably others who use this word to describe international law and
legal processes) do not mean to suggest that international law is always
ineffective or unsophisticated. Rather, the international legal system is
highly decentralized and institutionally undeveloped. In such a system, law
can easily become a "language of moralistic reproach," or a means of
... See MUMFORD, supra note 34, at 124-31.
157 See Id. at 12-17
'-" See infra notes 164-193 and accompanying text; see also Collins & Skover,
supra note 1. See generally Robert K. Logan, The Alphabet Effect: The Impact of
the Phonetic Alphabet on the Development of Western Civilization (1986);
Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy- The Making of Typographic Man
(1962); ONG, INTERFACES OFTHEWORD, supra note 40; WALTERJ. ONG, ORALITY
AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD (1982) [hereinafter ONG,
ORALITY AND LITERACY]; WALTER J. ONG, RHETORIC, ROMANCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY: STUDIES INTHE INTERACTION OF EXPRESSION AND CULTURE (1971);
BERTHOLD L. ULLMAN, ANCIENT WRITING AND ITS INFLUENCE (1932).
59 See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 535-52. See generally MARSHALL
McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA. THE ExTENSIONs OF MAN (1964).
'60 See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 71-78 (5th ed. 1963); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 89-91 (1961); HANSKELSEN,ANINTRODUCTIONTOTHEPROBLEMS OFLEGAL
THEORY 108-09 (Bonme Litschewski Paulson & Stanley Paulson trans., 1992);
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE 265 (4th ed. 1967) (1948); Yoram Dinstem, International Law as a
Pnmitive Legal System, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1986). But see B.S.
CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 47-55 (1993); A.I.L. Campbell, InternationalLaw
and Primitive Law, 8 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 169 (1988).
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cloaking national interest in apparently neutral normative terms, or even
"the concealment of factual changes with legal fictions." 161 Worst of all,
international law can appear to vacillate between pure "scholasticism inthe
face of urgent practical problems, and of the facile application of general
rules without a deep understanding of situations that are unique." 62
International law is so primitive that many still question whether it
deserves to be called law 163 One cannot overlook these limitations of
international law and its processes when considering how it might change
and is changing in response to the impacts of science and technology
To examine the changes in international law and its processes as
intellectual structures, I begin with a discussion of how technology has
affected law m general. Then I will focus on the specific interaction
between the intellectual structure of international law and its processes and
contemporary changes in science and technology Hopefully, in this way
we can arrive at some conclusions about where international law and its
processes are headed. We may even get some idea about where law in
general is headed.
A. How Law is Bound by Its Form
Law has taken different forms m different times and places, and it has
played different roles in different cultures. 64 Here, I want us to consider the
' Adam Roberts, ProlongedMilitary Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Tern-
tones Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 45 (1990).
162 id.
163 The question has been asked mcreasmgly emphatically at least since John
Austin m the nineteenth century. Cf JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE
122-25 (1954) (1863). See generally HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 18-89 (1952); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-12
(1977); MacLean, supra note 151, Scott, supra note 151, Glanville L. Williams,
International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word "Law, " 22 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'LL. 146 (1945); Robert O. Keohane, Comment, InternationalRelations
andInternationalLaw: Two Optics, 38 HARV INT'L L.J. 487 (1997); Thomas K.
Plofchan, Jr., Note, A Concept ofInternational Law: Protecting Systemic Values,
33 VA. J. INT'L L. 197 (1992).
164 See generally MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (1985); JOHN M. CONLEY &
WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF
LEGALDISCOURSE (1990); NOEL J. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSION IN ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1969); EUGEN EHRLICH, GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES
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ways in which law was recorded and recalled. Initially, law arises m oral
cultures without written records ("oral law"). Later, with the invention of
writing but with writing remaining a scarce and expensive craft, some
aspects of law are written down by those possessing the secret of writing
for reference on special occasions ("scribal law"). With the invention of
printing and the spread of literacy, more law is written down, and it is
accessible to anyone willing to devote himself or herself to mastering the
researching and the reading of the materials ("pnnted law"). Finally, in
recent decades we have begun to store and retrieve legal materials through
electronic means, makng the materials available to anyone with a
computer ("digital law").
I do not suggest that there is a precise timetable for transitions from
one stage to another. Different societies have entered upon these distinct
techniques for storing and retrieving law at different times and at different
rates. Nor do I mean to suggest that any of these techniques is "better" than
another technique. They are simply different, and they succeed each other
in time. Furthermore, in significant respects each of the earlier stages has
persisted even after the later stage has become dominant in a particular
society The functioning and effects of each technique deserves a brief
analysis.
1. Oral Law
Oral law depends on ritual and ceremony to manage society, with
collective memory (often physically embodied in a "lawspeaker") of
customary practices providing the link of past to present.16 This customary
law was highly flexible, particularly as the claim that a practice existed
from "before living memory" might involve a period as short as twenty
years in a society wholly dependent on oral tradition, and given the
RECHTs (1929); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SET'TLE DISPUTES (1991); HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW- NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 252, 267 (June Starr & Jane Collier eds.,
1989); VICTORH. LI, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES (1978); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETING JUSTICE
AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS
(1990); SALLYFALKMOORE, LAWAS PROCESS: ANANTHROPOLOGICALAPPROACH
(1978); EVERETM. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (1962); Alan Hyde, The
Concept ofLegitimization in the Sociology ofLaw, 1983 WIS. L. REV 379; Elihu
Katz, TheonzingDiffusion: Tarde and Sorolan Revisited, 566 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 144 (1999).
'65 See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 516-21.
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tendency to describe all innovations as if they were merely the established
custom. 166 Being without a written text, oral law was living law, localized
and contextualized, without a hierarchical bureaucracy 167 Law was
considered to be a product of society's "common conscience rather than
primarily as a deliberate expression of conscious reason or of will.' 16 In
sum, oral jurisprudence "was the expression of needs rather than of
knowledge.' 69
2. Scribal Law
The reduction of law to written forms began at about the same time that
the leading religions began to take written form. Indeed, the earliest written
statements of law-as with the Code of Hammurabz-were contained in
what were essentially religious documents. 7 The development of written
records of religious and legal duties initially was a very limited process,
affecting few societies and even fewer people within those societies. Then,
quite suddenly, within a space of the few decades between 550 and 450
B.C.E., all the religious and philosophical traditions that in coming
centuries would have global significance were codified in writing.'
The introduction of writing, for those exposed to it, transformed their
perception of the world every bit as much as the development of glass
windowpanes.7 Knowledge became fixed in the written word, to be
166 See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 114 (L.A. Manyon trans., 1961); ERIC
A. HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO 121 (1963); FRITZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW
IN THE MIDDLE AGES 179 (S.B. Chmes trans., 1939).
'67 See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 520.
16' Harold J. Berman, The Background of Western Legal Tradition in the
Folklaw of the Peoples ofEurope, 45 U. CHI. L. REV 553, 577 (1978).
169 BLoCH, supra note 166, at 114; see also HAVELOCK, supra note 166, at 122.
17 0 See C.H.W JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS AND
LETTERS (1999).
171 See A.C. BHAKTIVENDANTA SWAMIPRABHUPADA, THE BHAGAVID-GITAS
IT IS (1972) (Hinduism); A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (Wing-Tsit
Chan ed. & trans., 1963) (Confucianism; Daoism); ENTERING THE STREAM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE BUDDHA AND HIS TEACHINGS (Samuel Bercholz & Sherab
Chdzm Kohn eds., 1993) (Buddhism); GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Eric
Warmmgton &Philip Rouse eds., W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1956) (Platonism);Ezekiel,
Isaiah, & Jeremiah (Judaism); A.V WILLAMS JACKSON, ZOROASTER: THE
PROPHET OF ANCIENT IRAN (1898) (Zoroastrianism).
'7 See ONG, INTERFACES OF THE WORD, supra note 40; ONG, ORALITY AND
LITERACY, supra note 158; WALTER J. ONG, THE PRESENCE OF THE WORD (1967)
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analyzed, articulated, defined, and explained."r The etymology of these
words suggests clearly how the advent of writing, even in its most incipient
form, transformed the human relation to the world. "Analyze" comes from
the Greek ana-lein, to break into parts. "Articulate" comes from the Latin
articulare, to join, here through proper grammar and syntax. "Define"
comes from the Latin definire, to draw a line around. "Explain" comes
from the Latin, explanare, to lay out on the surface.
A text became a monument of one's thought, but a monument that was
abstracted from context. 174 The text became its own world, with the writing
or reading subject sharply differentiated from the object of knowledge. 17 5
As the eye can only look upon what is other than itself, reality became
objectified 7 6 With the writer seeing but unseen, the objective form of
discourse became possible m which the subject of the knowledge appears
to disappear.'"
In other words, a text becomes authoritative when it appears to speak
in universal and abstract terms. As one observer summarized the resulting
transformation, for a text to speak, the author must be silent. 7 1 The desire
to achieve universal validity perhaps explains why so many religious or
philosophical traditions began to formulate definitive texts within such a
brief span of time once it became possible to do so. It also probably
explains why laws also began to be codified-mcluding the "12 Tables" of
the decemvn in Rome, codified between 451 and 449 B.C.E. which
became the fount of the most influential legal tradition in human history 119
The reduction of law to written form, even before printing, so
fundamentally transformed it that, in the view of some, "the history of law
begins with the written word."'18 Law professors Ronald Collins and
[hereinafter ONG, PRESENCE].
1 I take these examples from Matthew A. Ritter, The Penile Code: The
Gendered Nature of the Language ofLaw, 2 N.Y CITY L. REv 1, 5-6 (1998).
'74 See ONG, PRESENCE, supra note 172, at 116.
175 See id. at 135-36.
76 See id. at 228.
'77 See ONG, INTERFACES OF THE WORD, supra note 40, at 121-22.
178 See Ritter, supra note 173, at 7
179 See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 3-14 (1969).
'80 WILLIAM SEAGLE, MEN OF LAW: FROM HAMMURABITO HOLMES 12 (1947).
Note also that Shakespeare follows his famous line about killing all the lawyers
with the rebel Cade's discourse on the evils of allowing parchment "to undo a
man." Later, Cade commands his followers to bum all the records of the realm.




David Skover summarized this transformation only slightly differently
when they wrote, "the story of law is one of distancing text from
context."'181 Writing law down fixed it, making future change both more
difficult and more conscious.' Writing also made law a "one-way
conversation" between the law-giver and those subject to the law,
extending the spatial and temporal reach of law by transforming law into
a thing to be studied and decoded.'83 Written law is abstract law, with the
individual stripped away to focus on general and evenumversal relations.I14
Scribal law did not take complete hold of legal procedure, however, if only
because most people could neither read nor write and retained an abiding
distrust of the authenticity and reliability of writing.'
3. Pnnted Law
Only with the advent of the ability to make exact reproductions of
innumerable copies of a text and the emergence of mass literacy, both
possible only following the development of movable type, could the
attributes of written law truly take hold.'86 The transition to printed law was
not without controversy 117 Those who opposed the printing of English legal
materials did so on the ground that it would vulgarize the law by opening
it to influence and pressure from the popular culture once law books
became available to the general public. 88 In the end, the desire for
administrative efficiency and popular legitimacy won out.
'~l Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 521.
182 As Chief Justice Camden expressed it: "[1]f this is law, it would be found m
our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not law." Entick v. Carrmgton, 19
Howell's St Tr. 1029, 1066 (I.B. 1765) (quoted in Collins & Skover, supra note
1, at 529).
'83 See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 521-29; BRIAN STOCK, THE IMPLI-
CATIONS OF LITERACY: WRITTEN LANGUAGE AND MODELS OF INTERPRETATION IN
THE ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES (1983); see also MCLUHAN, supra note
159.
1
84 See JACK GOODY, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE WRITTEN AND THE ORAL
75 (1987).
8- See M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRnrENRECoRD: ENGLAND, 1066-
1307, at 208-11 (1979).
'
86 See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 529-35.
'87See Richard J. Ross, The Commonng ofthe Common Law: TheRenaissance
Debate over Prnting English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. PA. L. REV 323 (1998).
'88 See id. at 380-86.
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A printed page's borders frame reality much like a window, pushing
the individual and her full life experience right off the page. Ethan Katsh
has summanzed the impact of the printed word in these words:
[T]he expression "in print" is more than a factual statement of where a
piece of information is located. In addition, the expression indicates
to us that the work is no longer readily changeable, that it has been bound
and cannot be unbound, that every available copy is the same as every
other copy, and that each copy will have those familiar identifying
characteristics such as atitle page, copyright notice, justified margins, and
index, characteristics that communicate m a visual way that the informa-
tion is m final form.1
8 9
Having confined its subjects, the pnntedtext permits one to categorize
and organize them through glossaries, indices, tables of contents, and
headings. 19° In short, "[p]rmt maximized the manuscript's power by
minimimzig its weaknesses."'i9i Just as the advent of the printed Bible
permitted a reformation of the manner in which the individual related to the
"word of God," 192 printing also remade the relationship between individuals
and the law Law became a monopoly of the state as it sought to centralize
all authority and, through law, to compel all persons within the state to
conform to a single standard of governmentally prescribed conduct.193
4. Digital Law
If these ideas about the impact of the dominant forms of communica-
tion in society on law and legal systems are correct, then the introduction
of computerization should bring about another grand transformation in
society and in law Perhaps a clue about what is happening in this regard
is a comment made by comedian Jay Leno: "We've reached a point where
9M. Ethan Katsh, LawRevews and the Migration to Cyberspace, 29 AKRON
L. REV 115, 119 (1996) [hereinafter Katsh, Law Reviews].
190 See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 530.
1911d., see also FLORIAN COULMAS, THE WRITING SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 11-
14 (1989); ELIZABETHEISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE 63,72-74,79-80,83 (1983); KATSH, THE ELECTRONICMEDIA, supra note
16, at 33-35, 85-86, 215-18; MCLUHAN, supra note 159, at 125, 156.
'192 EISENSTEN, supra note 191, at 147; LOGAN, supra note 158, at 217-23.




Congress does not affect anyone's life, so we look at it as entertainment."'94
Indeed, the 1990s have seen a remarkable wave of constitutional transfor-
mations across the globe."'9 Nothing comparable has been seen mthe world
since the "Age of Democratic Revolution" some two centuries earlier and
the rise of totalitarianism in the early twentieth century 196 The era that
ushered m the American and French Revolutions correlated with the
transformation of cultures and legal systems from scribal to printed forms.
The revolutionary transformations signaled by the Mexican, the Russian,
and the Nazi Revolutions could be seen as the final gasp of the attempt to
create a centralized, idealized system characteristic of pnnted law Today,
most of the planet seems to be moving in a different direction.
Looking more specifically at the law and legal systems of today, we
find a fundamental transformation in the way law is recorded and
enacted.'97 Even with the considerable debate surrounding the merits of
194 Howard Kurtz, Americans Waitfor the Punch Line on Impeachment, WASH.
POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at Al.
"I See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV
771 (1997); Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the
Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV L. REV 29 (1999); see also
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869
(1996).
196 See generally CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1938);
HECTOR AGUILAR CAMIN & LORENZO MEYER, IN THE SHADOW OF THE MEXICAN
REVOLUTION: CONTEMPORARYMEXICAN HISTORY, 1910-1989 (Luis Alberto Fierro
trans., 1993); ORLANDOFIGES,APEOPLE'S TRAGEDY; THERUSSIANREVOLUTION,
1891-1924 (1997); E.. HOBSBAWM, THEAGE OFREVOLUTION: EUROPE 1789-1848
(1962); R.R. PALMER, THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800 (1959); WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY (1960).
'97 See G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET (1995);
CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 89; KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA, supra note
16; EDKROL, THE WHOLEINTERNETUSER'S GUIDEAND CATALOG (1995); DANIEL
E. ROSE, A SYMBOLIC AND CONNECTIONIST APPROACH TO LEGAL INFORMATION
RETRIEVAL (1994); Bnckner, supra note 6; Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 535-
52; John King Gamble, BroadeningAccess to InternationalLawResources through
New Technology, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1 (1995); John King Gamble,
International Law and the Information Age, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 747 (1996);
Francis A. Gilligan & Edward J. Imwmkelned, Cyberspace: The Newest Challenge
for TraditionalLegalDoctnne, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 305 (1998);
Graham Greenleaf et al., Representing and Using Legal Knowledge in Integrated
Decision Support Systems: DataLex WorkStations, 3 ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE &
L. 97 (1995); Marc Lauritsen, TechnologyReport: WorkProductRetneval Systems
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televising actual legal proceedings, 191 several courts have begun to
cablecast their proceedings over the Internet, creating virtual courtrooms.
199
in Today'sLawOffices, 3 ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE &L. 287 (1996); Philip Leith,
The Judge and the Computer- How Best "Decision Support"?, 6 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 289 (1998); Douglas E. Litowitz, Has Technology Improved
the Practice ofLaw?, 21 J. LEGAL PROF 51 (1997); Henry Prakken & Giovanni
Sartor, Modelling Reasoning with Precedents in a Formal Dialogue Game, 6
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 231 (1998); G. Sartor & L. Karl Branting,
Introduction: Judicial Applications of Artficial Intelligence, 6 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 105 (1998); Un Schild, Criminal Sentencing and Intelligent
Decision Support, 6 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE &L. 151 (1998); J.C. Smith et al.,
A rtficial Intelligence and Legal Discourse: The Flexlaw Legal Text Management
System, 3 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 55 (1995); Symposium, Courtroom
2000: Technology and the Legal System, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV 523 (1999); Cyrus
Tata, The Application ofJudicial Intelligence and "'Rules " to Systems Supporting
Discretionary Judicial Decision-Malang, 6 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 203
(1998); Howard Turtle Text Retrieval in the Legal World, 3 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 5 (1995); Eugene Volokh, Computer Media for the Legal
Profession, 94 MICH. L. REV 2058 (1996); Wassom, supra note 6; Timothy Q.
Delaney, Coming Clean on E-Mail Discovery: Soap Giant Proctor & Gamble,
Amway Battle Shows Need for Clear Rules, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at 74; William
C. Gleisner, I, Laptop Litigation: Electronic Advocacy Utilizing Summation ,
TrialDirector® and Microsoft Office 97®, 43 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 1 (1999); Mark
Grossman, Cyberlaw: Lawyers Lookfor the Cutting Edge, LEGAL TIMES, May 24,
1999, at25; Hope Viner Samborn, Colleagues in Space: OnlineDiscussion Groups
Prove Uniquely Informative-andAddictive, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at 80; Taylor,
supra note 6. Law, of course, is not the only profession facing dramatic
transformations as a result of the digitalization of information. See Gina Kolata,
Web Research Transforms Visit to the Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at Al
(describing how the Internet has changed the relationship between doctor and
patient).
198 See RONALD L. GOLDFARB, TV ORNOT TV- TELEVISION, JUSTICE, AND THE
COURTS (1998); Jay C. Carlisle, An Open Courtroom: Should Cameras Be
Permitted in New York State Courts, 18 PACE L. REV 297 (1998); Rebecca Leigh
Cassal, Cameras in the Courtroom, FED. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 22.
199 See Hope Viner Sambom, Plenty ofSeats in Virtual Courtrooms: 'Webcasts'
of Judicial Proceedings Gaining-and Educating-a Wide Audience, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 2000, at 68, listing thesewebsites: <www.flcourts.org/courts/supct> [Fla. Sup.
Ct.]; <www.law.emory.edu/ILAW/SupremeCourt.html> [Ga. Sup. Ct.]; <www.
mumcipalcourt.org> [Del. (Ohio) Mun. Ct.]; <www.nmja9.org/courtadmin/mlis/
courtroom_23.htm> (Fla. Ct. App. 9th Cir.]; <www.state.m.us> [Ind. Sup. Ct.]; see
also Frank Conley, -) Service with a Smiley: The Effect of E-Mail and Other
Electronic Communications on Service ofProcess, 11 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J.
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Even without broadcasting (or narrowcasting), video processes are
transforming the trial process. A videotaped record of a trial, of"a day m
the life" of an accident victim, of a will, or of a legislative session, or even
computer-aninated modeling,2°° all serve to recontextualize law and the
persons involved with legal proceedings.2"' The United States Supreme
407 (1997); Jessica R. Herrera, Litigators Benefit as More Courts Open Websites:
Internet Provides QuickInformation; Permits Electronic Filing, LrrIG. NEWS, May
1999, at 5.
2 o See Constantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164 (2dCir. 2000) (holding avideotape
used to train physicians on a particular medical procedure admissible under the
"learned treatise" exception to the hearsay rule); James E. Carbine & Lynn
McLam, Proposed Model Rules Governing the Admissibility of Computer-
Generated Evidence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1999);
James I. Keane, Prestidigitalization: Magic, Evidence and Ethics in Forensic
Digital Photography, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV 585 (1999); Fredrlc I. Lederer, Some
Thoughts on the Evidentiary Aspects of Technologically Presented or Produced
Evidence, 28 Sw. U. L. REv 389 (1999); L. Matthew Springer, Comment, A Far
Cryfrom Katz: Deciding the Constitutionality ofPrewarrant Thermal lmagmg, 25
OHIO N.U. L. REv 593 (1999); Michael V Ciresi & Jan M. Conlin, A High-Tech
Case: Lessonsfrom Honeywell v. Minolta, TRIAL, Sept. 1992, at 22; Fred 1. Heller,
The Televised Witness: Preparing Videotapted Depositions, TRIAL, Sept. 1992, at
50; Ralph A. Taylor, Jr., Visual Persuasion in the Courtroom: Tips for More
Effective Trial Presentation, 25 LITIG. NEWS, Jan. 2, 2000, at 12.
201 See GREGORY P JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL EvIDENCE (1984); ASHLEY S.
LIPSON,ARTOFADVOCACY: DEMONSTRATIVEEVIDENCE (1999); Karen D. Butera,
Seeing Is Believing: A Practitioner's Guide to the Admissibility ofDemonstrative
Computer Evidence, 46 CLEv ST. L. REV 511 (1998); Timothy W Cerniglia,
Computer-Generated Exhibits-Demonstrative, Substantive or Pedagogical
-Their Place in Evidence, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1994); I. Neel Chatterjee,
Admitting Computer Animations: More Caution and New Approach Are Needed,
62 DEF COUNs. J. 36 (1995); Richard M. Dunn & Christopher D. Brown, Some
Suggestions on Admitting Computer Graphics into Evidence at Trial, 65 DEF
COUNS. J. 526 (1998); Kathlynn G. Fadely, Use of Computer-Generated Visual
Evidence in Aviation Litigation: Interactive Video Comes to Court, 55 J. AIRL. &
COM. 839 (1990); Samuel A. Guiberson, Technology and Advocacy in the New
Technology Courtroom, 28 SW. U. L. REV 405 (1999); Stanley A. Kurzban,
Authentication of Computer-Generated Evidence in the United States Federal
Courts, 35 IDEA 437 (1995); Linda C. Morell, New Technology: Experimental
Research on the Influence of Computer-AnimatedDisplay on Jurors, 28 SW U.L.
REV 411 (1999); Crag Murphy, Computer Simulations and Video Re-enactments:
Fact, Fantasy andAdmission Standards, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REv 145 (1990); Adam
T. Berkoff, Comment, Computer Simulations in Litigation: Are Television
Generation Jurors Being Misled?, 77 MARQ. L. REV 829 (1994); Elaine M.
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Court has already begun to refashion the constitutional commands
regarding evidence to reflect the availability of electromc media. 02 On the
other hand, computerized indexing and the possibility of rules restricting
Chaney, Note, Computer Simulations: How They Can Be Used at Trial and the
Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND. L. REV 735 (1986); Patrick R. Grady,
Comment, Discovery of Computer Stored Documents and Computer Based
Litigation Support Systems: Why Give up More than Necessary, 14 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523 (1996); Paul F Eckstein & Samuel A. Thumma,
Getting Scientific Evidence Admitted: The Daubert Hearng, LITIG., Winter 1998,
at2l. See generally EDWARD R. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION (1990); Frank
Andrews, Computer-Integrated Courtrooms: Enhancing Advocacy, TRIAL, Sept.
1992, at 37; George P Field, Using a Computer at Counsel Table, TRIAL, Sept.
1992, at 30; Richard Ryan Lamb, When Courts Videotape Proceedings, TRIAL,
Sept. 1992, at 44; Willis H. Riccio, Securities Litigation and Computer-Generated
Evidence, R.I. B.J., Feb. 1998, at 17; Heywood Waga, New Court Reporting
Systems, TRIAL, Sept 1992, at 40.
202 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (permitting the use of one-way
closed-circuit television for the presentation of a child's testimony m a child abuse
prosecution); see also People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1984)
(approving the use of computer animation as evidence in a prosecution for
vehicular homicide). See generally Josephine A. Bulkey, Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Ease Child Abuse Prosecutions: Use of Closed-Circuit Television and
Children's Statements ofAbuse Under the Confrontation Clause, 16 NOVA L. REV
687 (1992); Richard L. Marcus, CompletingEquity's Conquest? Reflections on the
Future of Trial under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV
725, 745-49 (1989); John B. Mitchell, What Would Happen if Videotaped
Depositions ofSexually Abused Children Were Routinely Admitted in Civil Suits?
A Journey Through the Legal Process and Beyond, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV
261 (1992); Nancy Schleifer, Might versus Fright: The Confrontation Clause and
the Search for "Truth" in the Child Abuse Family Court Case, 16 NOVA L. REV
783 (1992); Clive Walker, Fundamental Rights, Fair Trials and the New Audio-
Visual Sector, 59 MOD. L. REV 517 (1996); Peter T. Wendel, A Law and
Economics Analysis ofthe Right to Face-to-Face Confrontation Post-Maryland v.
Craig: Distinguishing the Forestfrom the Trees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV 405 (1993);
Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power
and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1323 (1991).
The new technologies also give rise to disturbing problems about the ability of
the government to search or seize digital data. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1998);
Gilligan & Imwmkelned, supra note 197; Raphael Winick, Searches andSeizures
of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV J.L. & TECH. 75 (1994); Michael
Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, andDigital Contraband: The Fourth
Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093 (1996).
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the extent that electromc records are received into evidence permit the land
of systemized closure characteristic of printed law
At the end of the day digital law challenges nearly all of our established
notions regarding boundaries.0 3 It not only erodes political boundaries, but.
it erodes economic and intellectual ones as well.2°4 Placing information on
the Internet, unlike printing, puts it m a form that is not only readily
accessible for very little cost, but a form that can easily be changed by the
author or a reader. While one can more easily add highly effective graphics
to digital documents compared to printing,2°5 one might find that these
203 See FRANCES CAIRNCROss, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: How THE COMMUNI-
CATIONS REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES (1997); KATSH, LAW IN A
DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 10, at 218-19; MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN
SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERs:ADvOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1998); TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS:
SOLIDARITYBEYONDTHE STATE (Jackie Smith et al. eds., 1997); Jeffrey M. Ayres,
From National to Popular SovereigntyP The Evolving Globalization of Protest
Activity in Canada, 16 INT'LJ. CAN. STUD. 107 (1997); DavidR. Johnson & David
Post, Law and Borders-The Rise ofLaw in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV 1367
(1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Zones ofCyberspace,48 STAN.L.REV 1403(1996);
Symposium, Law without Borders in the Information Age, 43 WAYNE L. REV 95
(1996).
204 See generallyDAVIjDBRiN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY
FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998); BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE (Brian Kahln & Charles Nesson eds., 1997); THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUs AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION
(1999); NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995); Rosemary J. Coombe,
Authorial Cartographies: MappzngPropnetaryBorders in aLess-than-BraveNew
World, 48 STAN. L. REV 1357 (1996); Walter A. Effross, Withdrawal of the
Reference: Rights, Rules, and Remedies for Unwelcomed Web-Linlang, 49 S.C. L.
REV 651 (1998); Andy Johnson-Laird, TheAnatomy ofthelnternetMeets theBody
of the Law, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV 465 (1997); Johnson & Post, supra note 203;
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: DrawingBorders in a Virtual World,
82 MINN. L. REV 609 (1998); Joseph I. Rosenbaum, Privacy on the Internet:
WhoseInformationisitAnyway?, 38 JURIMETRICS 565 (1998); Frederick Schauer,
Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinction, 38 JURIMETRICS 555 (1998).
'205 See KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 10, at 133-71; Thomas
R. Bruce, Swilf, Modest Proposals, Babies, and Bathwater" Are Hibbits's Writes
Right?, 30 AKRON L. REV 243 (1996); Bernard J. Hibbits, Last Writes? Re-
Assessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV 615,670-
71 (1996); Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action, supra note 86; Gregory E. Maggs, Self-
Publication on the Internet and the Future ofLawReviews, 30 AKRONL. REV. 237
(1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Reassessing Professor Hibbitts's Requiem for Law
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virtues are outweighed by the loss of control over the documents. The
mteractivity and hyperlinking possible on the Internet mean that a
document is no longer fixed, uniform, and easily authenticated, as it would
be in printed form.2°0 The transition from typewriter to word processor
seemed so simple, the newer technology apparently emulating the older,
that many schooled in the oldtechnologies have overlooked the fundamen-
tal changes inherent in this transition.2 7 George Landow has summarized
how this transforms our thinking as well as our reading:
Reviews, 30 AKRON L. REV 255 (1996); David A. Rier, The Future of Legal
Scholarship and Scholarly Communication: Publication in theAge of Cyberspace,
30AKRONL.REV 183 (1996).
20 See JAYDAVID BOLTER, WRITING SPACE: THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND
THE HISTORY OFWRITING (1991); HYPER/TEXT/THEORY (George P Landow ed.,
1994); KATSH, LAW INA DIGrrAL WORLD, supra note 10, at 92-113; ROSE, supra
note 197; SCHOLARLY JOURNALS ATTHE CROSSROADS: A SUBVERSIVE PROPOSAL
FORELECTRONICPUBLISHING (Ann ShumeldaOkerson &James J. O'Donnell eds.,
1995); SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING: THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (Robm P Peek &
Gregory B. Newby eds., 1996); TExT, CONTEXT, AND HYPERTEXT: WRITING WITH
AND FOR THE COMPUTER (Edward Barrett ed., 1988); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting
Cars on the "Information Superhighway" Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in
Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV 1466 (1995); Greenleaf et al., supra note 197; I.
Trotter Hardy, Project CLEAR's Paper Choice: A Hypertext System for Giving
Advice about Legal Research, 82 LAW LIBR. J. 209 (1990); Hibbitts, supra note
205; Katsh, Law Reviews, supra note 189, at 119; Lauritsen, supra note 197;
Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glusko, Electronic Communications and Legal
Change: Intellectual Property RightsforDigitalLibrary and HypertextPublishing
Systems, 6 HARV J. L. & TECH. 237 (1993); Lauren H. Seiler, The Future of the
Scholarly Journal, 74 MOD. LANGUAGE J. 1 (1990); Smith et al., supra note 197;
Ronald W. Staudt, LegalMindstorms: Lawyers, Computers and Powerful Ideas, 31
JURIMETRICS 171 (1991); McDonough, supra note 113; Shawn G. Pearson,
Comment, Hype orHypertext? A Planfor the LawReview to Move into the Twenty-
First Century, 1997 UTAH L. REV 765; Katie Hafner, Physics on the Web is
Putting Science Journals on the Line, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1998, atF3; David R.
Johnson, Building and Using Hypertext Systems, LAW PRAC. MGMT., May-June
1991, at 28; Robert Pear, N..LH. Plan for Journal on the Web Draws Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 1999, at Fl.
o See Espen Aarseth, Nonlinearity and Literary Theory, in HYPER/TEXT/
THEORY,supra note 206, at 51,52; see also GEORGE P. LANDOW, HYPERTET: THE
CONVERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 18-19
(1992); Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 510; Gamble, supra note 71, at 773-80;
Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38




Hypertext fragments, disperses, or atomizes text in two related ways.
First, by removing the linearity of print, it frees the individual passages
from one ordering priciple-sequence-and threatens to transform the
text into chaos. Second, hypertext destroys the notion of a fixed unitary
text. Considering the "entire" text in relation to its component parts
produces the first form of fragmentation; considering it in relation to its
variant readings and versions produces the second.20 8
Even such a hallowed system as how lawyers are educated is now
under challenge as law schools and their regulatory institutions begin to
consider the possibilities of "distance education" and other
transformations. 2 9 The nonlinearity of digital texts plays a central role here
as well, promising dramatic changes to "the role of student, teacher,
assignment, evaluation, reading list, as well as relations among individual
instructors, courses, departments, and disciplines."2 "° How such changes
will play out in the intellectual structure of the law, which tendencies will
prevail,21' and how these changes will affect what we have come to
describe as the "rule of law,' 12 remain serious and open questions. Judging
208 LANDOW, supra note 207, at 54.
29 See Katsh, LawReviews, supra note 189; Beverly Tarpley, Keeping Up with
Technology, SYLLABUS, Winter 1998, at 8; see also John N. Hickman,
Cybercheats: Term-Paper Shopping Online, NEW REP., Mar. 23, 1998, at 14.2 0 LANDOW, supra note 207, at 163.
21 See Gordon Bermant, Courting the Virtual: Federal Courts in an Age of
Complete Inter-Connectedness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV 527 (1999); Paul J. Johns,
Changing Traditional Education; and Creating New Judicial Responsibilities, 25
OHIO N.U. L. REV 569 (1999); Joseph F Weiss, Jr. & Gordon Bermant,
Automation in the Federal Courts: Progress, Prospects, and Problems, JUDGES J.,
Fall 1987, at 14.
2 12 See ROBERTM. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTIsLAvERYANDTHE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW" ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 211-26 (1979); WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 68;
Bobby K Baldock, Justice and the Rule ofLaw: A Contradiction in Terms?, 15 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 57 (1990); Blum, supra note 68; Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist
Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85 AM. J. INT'LL. 613 (1991); Cover, supra note
68; Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379
(1990); Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule ofLaw, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
633 (1990); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule ofLaw:
New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV 2099 (1989); Came Menkel-
Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Malang New
Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMIL.REv.29 (1987); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV L. REV 4 (1986); Martha Minow,
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from the earliest responses, law and society seem once again to be
decentralizing power and dispute resolution.213 Another way of describing
this change is to note a trend toward relying on private solutions to social
issues in the "virtual world.
' 14
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV L. REV 10 (1987); Margaret Jane
Radin, Reconsiderng the Rule ofLaw, 69 B.U. L. REV 781 (1989); Smith, supra
note 68; Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule ofLaw, 5 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 965 (1990); Laurence H. Tribe, Revisiting the Rule ofLaw, 64
N.Y.U.L. REV 726 (1989); West Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 68; Klaus
A. Ziegert, Courts and the Self-concept ofLaw: The Mapping of the Environment
by Courts ofFirst Instance, 14 SYDNEY L. REV 196 (1992).
213 See COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OP-
PORTUNITIES, MOBILZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS (Doug
McAdam et al. eds., 1996); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DISILLUSIONMENT WITH
DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL PARTIES, PARTICIPATION AND NON-PARTICIPATION IN
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE (1994); LAwRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE
ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
(1995); JORGENHABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (1989); THE
STATE OF THE PARTIES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
PARTIES (John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea eds., 3d ed. 1999); MARTIN P
WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS OF THE 1980S (1991); John H. Aldrich, Political Parties in a Critical
Era, 27 AM. POL. Q. 9 (1999); Jeffrey M. Ayres, From the Streets to the Internet:
The Cyber-Diffusion of Contention, 566 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132
(1999); Bruce Bimber, The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism,
Community, andAccelerated Pluralism, 31 POLITY 133 (1998); Robert L. Dunne,
Detemng UnauthorizedAccess to Computers: ControllingBehavior in Cyberspace
Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMETRICS 1 (1994); I. Trotter Hardy,
The Proper Legal Regimefor "Cyberspace, " 55 U. PITT. L. REV 993 (1994);
David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications
onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (and Our
Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 VILL. L. REV 487 (1993); Hank Johnston & Shoon
Lio, Looking Backward to Look Forward, 41 SOC. PERSP 453 (1998); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network Communities, 38 VILL. L.
REV 349 (1993); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Malang in
Cyberspace, 45 EMORYL.J. 911 (1996); R.A.W. Rhodes, TheHollowing Out ofthe
State: The Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain, 65 POL. Q. 138
(1994); Sidney Tarrow, Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review
Article, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV 874 (1996); Matthew J. Feeley, Note, EUInternet
Regulation Policy: The Rise of Self-Regulation, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP L. REV
159 (1999).
214 See Carole M. Rose, The Several Features ofProperty: Of Cyberspace and
Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV 129, 130 (1998);
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The resulting social and legal decentralization m some ways is
reminiscent of the village culture characteristic of oral and even scribal
law, which has given rise to the inherently contradictory expression "global
village" to describe the emerging culture and, at least by implication, its
law 215 Whether we shall ever truly get to the situation of "legal pluralism"
once so characteristic of oral and scribal law remains to be seen.216 The one
see also Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace or How an Evil Clown, a Haitian
Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a
Society, 2 ANN. SURV AM. L. 471 (1994); Mark L. Gordon & Diana J.P
McKenzie, A Lawyer's Roadmap of the Information Superhighway, 13 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177 (1995); Lessig, supra note 16; Oedel,
supra note 88; Peter P Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International
Choice of Law and the Internet, 32 INT'L LAW. 991 (1998). But see Frank H.
Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F 207;
Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV 1199 (1998).
215 See RICHARD A. FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-
WESTPHALIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A
Theory ofPath Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN.
L. REV 127, 134 (1999); Seth F Berkley, AIDS in the Global Village: Why U.S.
Physicians Should Care about HIV outside the United States, 268 JAMA 3368
(1992); Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in a Global Village, 47 VAND. L.
REV 1441 (1994); Justine Levine, A History and Analysis of the Federal
Communications Commission's Response to Radio Broadcast Hoaxes, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 273 (2000); David A. Martin, New Rules on Dual Nationality for a
Democratizing Globe: Between Rejection and Embrace, 14 GEO. IMM. L.J. 1, 5
(1999); G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs
Jurisprudence, 70 U. COLO. L. REV 1109, 1122 (1999); Jitka Smith, Comment,
Budweiser orBudweiser?, 32 J. MARSHALLL.REV 1251,1258,1278(1999);Irvm
Molotsky, Chernobyl and the "Global Village, "N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1986, atB22.
216 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983); PAUL VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN
MEDIEVALEUROPE (1929); see also THOMAS B. STEVENS, ORDERANDDISCIPLINE
IN CHINA. THE SHANGHAIMIXED COURT 1911-1927 (1992); P.E.B. Coy, Justicefor
the Indian in Eighteenth Century Mexico, 12 AM. J. LEGAL IST. 41 (1968).
For contemporary appeals for legal pluralism, see ANNE HELLUM, WOMEN'S
HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGALPLURALISM IN AFRICA. MIXEDNORMS AND FERTILITY
MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE (1997); M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS (1975); Marc Galanter &
David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U.
L. REV 1393 (1993); Richard D. Garcia & Todd Howland, Determining the
Legitimacy of Spanish Land Grants in Colorado: Conflicting Values, Legal
Pluralism, and Demystification ofthe Sangre de Cristo/Rael Cases, 16 CHICANO-
LATINOL. REV. 39 (1995); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J.LEGAL
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thing we can be certain of is that the forms of law with which we are
familiar are already passing from the scene.
Thus far, only afew countries have attempted to exert control over the
emerging "electroi village." The most notable example is China, where
the government has attempted to impose tight restrictions on who can use
the Internet and for what purposes.217 The Chinese government has even
charged entrepreneur Lin Hai with "inciting subversion of state power" for
the unauthorized provision of e-mail addresses to "hostile foreign
publications." 8 Actually controlling the movement of information through
the Internet might prove to be a hopeless effort, as even China could find
that it lacks the resources to police the near infinite volume of messages
and information easily transmitted around the barriers it is attempting to
impose upon Internet traffic. 219 China, after all, has only recently under-
taken to enter into the age of printed law 1o Proposed technological
PLURALISM &UNOFFICIALL. 1 (1986); BenjaminmA. Kahn, The LegalFramework
Surrounding Maori Claims to WaterResources in New Zealand: In Contrast to the
American Indian Experience, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 49 (1999); Sally Engle Merry,
LegalPluralism, 22 LAWSoC'YREv 869 (1988); AndreaM. Setelstad, Unwritten
Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures, and Clinical Legal Education, 6
CLINICAL L. REv 127 (1999); Brian Tamanaha, The Folly of the "Social
Scientific" Concept ofLegal Pluralism, 20 J. LAW & Soc'Y 192 (1993); Gunther
Teubner, The Two Faces ofJanus: Rethinlang Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L.
REV 1443 (1992).
217 See David Bachman, Succession Politics and China's Future, 49 J. INT'L
AFF. 370,379-80,382-83 (1996); Peter Ferdinand, Social Change andthe Chinese
Communist Party: Domestic Problems ofRule, 49 J. INT'L AFF 478 (1996); Dali
L. Yang & Houkai Wei, RisingSectionalism in China, 49 J. INT'LAFF. 456 (1996);
Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Lists Controls to Restrict the Use ofE-Mail and Web,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,2000, atAl; see also STEWART BAKER & PAUL HURST, THE
LIMITS OF TRUST 130 (1998); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV 709
(1995); Amy Knoll, Comment, Any Which Way but Loose: Nations Regulate the
Internet, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP L. 275 (1996).
211 Erik Eckholm, A Trial Will Test China's Grip on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1998, atA8. The addresses were used by democracy advocates based in
the United States to e-mail articles into China; Mr. Lm claims that he was only
exchangmg addresses so he could build his e-mail business.
219 See generally Froomnkm, supra note 86; M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds
andtheFirstAmendment: VirtualDoorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F 335 [hereinafter Katsh, Software Worlds]; Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and
What It Will Do, 104 YALEL.J. 1805 (1995).
m See generally CONTRACT, GUANxI, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA
(Tahirih V. Lee ed., 1997); DOMESTIC LAWREFORMS INPOST-MAO CHINA (Pitman
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controls over Web access might eventually succeed, but at a cost beyond
the simple expense of introducing the necessary technology 21 If China
succeeds in controlling the flow of information over the Web, it can only
do so by severely limiting the utility of Cyberspace for the Chinese
economy, Chinese academics, and Chinese society-preciselythe opposite
of what the Chinese government itself hopes to achieve through access to
the Web.=
B. How International Law is Affected by the Changing Forms ofLaw
The foregoing analysis describes, admittedly m highly general terms,
the successive transformations wrought in national legal systems by basic
changes in communications technologies. One of the enduring problems in
international law is that in many ways it remains a primitive legal system,
still functioning largely mthe scribalmode.m While the legal sources were
usually fixed in written form, the materials were often difficult even to
locate, let alone to read and interpret correctly As a result, until very
B. Potter ed., 1994); RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FORTHE RULE OF LAW
(1994); LAW, THE STATE, AND SOCIETY IN CHINA (Tahnih V Lee ed., 1997);
CARLOS WING-HUNG LO, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENIG: LEGAL THEORY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN DENG'S ERA (1995); Joseph W Dellapenna, The Role of
Legal Rhetoric in the Failure ofDemocratic Change in China, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L.
231 (1996); Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in
the People's Republic of China, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122 (1996); Chn Kim,
The Modem Chinese Legal System, 61 TUL. L. REV 1413 (1987); Stanley B.
Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China afterDengXiaoping: "'Mao andMediation "
Revisited, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229 (1997); Daniel C. Turack, The New Chinese
Criminal Justice System, 7 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP L. 49 (1999); Ding
Xueliang, The Ongin and Conceptual Development of "Modernization " Theory,
ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KExUE, Jan. 1988, at 65 (in Chinese); Jiang Xun, The
Modernization of China's Legal Culture, 7 FAXUE 12 (1987) (in Chinese).
221 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999);
Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws
Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997); Katsh, Software
Worlds, supra note 219; Lawrence Lessig, What Thzngs Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0
vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS 629 (1998); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:
The Formulation oflnformation PolicyRules through Technology, 76 TEX.L.REV
553 (1998); Semitsu, supra note 145; Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453 (1997).
' See China's Biggest Website to Be Listed Overseas, BELTING REv., Nov. 13,
1999, at 26; Greeting an E-Business Era, supra note 11.
m See supra notes 170-185 and accompanying text.
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recently the international lawyers fixed their focus firmly on customary
law.' Like customary (oral) law generally, international law remained
fluid and highly contextual,' despite the glimmerings of pretension to
universal norms. 6
Only within this century has the international legal order begun to
adopt fully the forms appropriate to printed law, with multilateral
treaties,22 7 formal judicial opmions,22 8 and devices for making "custom"
consciously and concretely 229 One commentator noted these changes and
224 See ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1971); KELSEN, supra note 160, at 311-13; Michael Akehurst, Custom as a
Source.ofInternational Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1977).
1 See Christine Chinkin & Romana Sadurska, The Anatomy ofInternational
Dispute Resolution, 7 OHIO ST. J. DIsP RESOL. 1 (1991); Dellapenna, Jordan
Valley, supra note 108; I. William Zartman, Conflict andResolution: Contest, Cost,
and Change, 518 ANNALS OF AM. ASS'N POL. & SOC. SCI. 11 (1991).
' See FRANCK, supra note 151, at 147-53; Boyle, supra note 152, at 349-52.
2 27 SeeANTHONYA. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT
123-25 (1987); R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary
International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1968).
228 See Mohammed Bedjaoui, The "Manufacture" of Judgments at the Inter-
national Court ofJustice, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 29 (1991); Giorgio Bosco, New
Trends on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 235 (1991); Jonathon I. Charney, Customary InternationalLaw in the
Nicaragua Case: Judgment on the Merits, 1988 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 16; Keith
Highet, The Peace PalaceHeats Up: The World Court in BusinessAgain?, 85 AM.
J. INT'L L. 646 (1991); Jos6 Maria Ruda, Some of the Contributions of the
International Court ofJustice to the Development ofInternationalLaw, 24 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 35 (1991); David J. Scheffer, Non-Judicial State Remedies and
the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 83
(1990).
The International Court of Justice bases its decisions on custom (including
general pnnciples of law) or treaty-based law, and not on its own decisions except
as evidence of the primary sources. See Statute ofthe International Court ofJustice
[heremafterICJStatute], art. 38, openedforsignature June 26, 1945,59 Stat. 1055
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
229SeeP.P.DHOKALIA, CODIFICATION OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW(1970);
H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARYLAWAND CODIFICATION(1972);
Danilenko, supra note 31, Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of
International Law, 49 AM. 3. INT'L L. 16 (1955); Oscar Schachter, International
Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEILDES COURS 9 (1982); Paul C. Szasz, The
Role ofthe U.N. Secretary-General: Some Legal Aspects, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 161 (1991); Phillip P. Tnmble,A Revisionist View ofCustomaryInternational
Law, 33 UCLA L. REv 665 (1986).
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described them as a trend toward the creation of a lex scnpta, ° including
such mechanisms as UN General Assembly" resolutions or International
Law Commission studies"3 as devices for making customary law more
fixed and promptly retrievable. While the language of customary law
continues, increasingly that language is more of a legal fiction than an
accurate description of how international law functions. 3 Before this
process has been completed, we are confronted with a typical paratextual
demand that international law be reconceived as an open-ended conversa-
tion, an uncoerced discourse, that will bind disputants together in their
commitmentto resolve their mutual problems through nnagining new ways
to cope with social conflict.234
Those of us who practice international law need to attend more to the
implications of the interactive process between means, ends, and mtellec-
tual structures if we are to better control, or even merely better respond to,
the processes transforming the world in which we live."' To understand
and to manage this intersection of law with science and technology, we
need both to reconfigure our means for collecting and analyzing our
knowledge of scientific concepts and the technologies reshaping the world
even while we reconsider the institutions for decision-making approprate
230 See THIRLWAY, supra note 229, at 1-16; see also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 235 (1947).
23' See R.S. Gupta, Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly as a
Source of International Law, 23 INT'L STUD. 143 (1986); Christopher C.
Joyner, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinkng
the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-creation, 11 CAL. W INT'L L.L 445
(1981).
232 See B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: ITS AP-
PROACH TO THE CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977); IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION (1987); B. Graefrath, The International Law Commission Tomor-
row: Improving Its Organization and Methods of Work, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 595
(1991).
11 See KENNEDY, supra note 152, at 39; Allott, supra note 151, Baxter, supra
note 227; Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of
Declarative International Law, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 87 (1991); Gamble, supra note
71, at 781-86; Schachter, supra note 229.
234 See, e.g., KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 152, at 486-501, see also CARTY, supra
note 28, at 113-15; KENNEDY, supra note 152; Trask, supra note 120.
23 The problem of means-ends fluidity is a long-standing and fairly com-
monplace topic of discussion m the philosophy of ethics. See, e.g., Morton A.
Kaplan, Means/Ends Rationality, 87 ETHICS 61 (1976); see also Johnston, supra
note 151.
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to our increasingly interdependent and technologized world.236 Only by
attending to the intellectual structures as well as to the material conditions
of the decision-making processes can we hope to make reasonably
appropriate decisions in the face of the pervasive uncertainty generated by
the rapid changes in science and technology 211
Revising our decision-makng processes will include the creation of
transnational facilities for gathering and assessing information, for
coordinating policies andlaws, andresolving disputes. Yet, by farthe most
interesting and important aspect of the overall process of interaction
between law and technology is the structural alteration of the law itself,
challenging our received conceptions of the international community that
is the subject of that law During the period of state-centered legal theory,
international lawyers have had to contend with the question of whether
international law really is law." 8 Today, as the deconstruction project
decenters the state in municipal law,239 modem technology has also
radically reduced the importance of the traditional nation-state,240 although
236 See Allott, supra note 151, Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative
Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV 779 (1988); Seyom
Brown & Larry L. Fabian, Toward Mutual Accountability in the Nonterrestnal
Realms, 29 INT'L ORG. 877 (1975); Gamble, supra note 71, F V Garci,-Amador,
Current Attempts to Revise International Law-A Comparative Analysis, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 286 (1983); Ernst B. Haas, Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge,
Technology, Interdependence and the Construction ofInternational Regimes, 29
INT'L ORG. 827 (1975); Edward McWhmney, TheNeedfor a New General Theory
of International Law, 23 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1985); see also WILLIAM J.
KAUFMAN ill & LARRY L. SMARR, SUPERCOMPUTING AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF SCIENCE (1993).
237 See PETER WILLIAM HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1993); Allott, supra note 151, Victor Baker, Uncertainty and
Tolerance in Science andDecisionmaking, 9 ARIZ. J.INT'L&COMP. L. 253 (1992);
Donald T. Hornstem, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV 562 (1992); Zhou Dadi,
Environmental Considerations in the Economic Development of China, 9 ARiz. J.
INT'L & COMP L. 221 (1992).
2 8 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
2 40 See ROBERT A. FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-
WESTPHALIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES:
SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONALRELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990); L. ALl
KHAN, THE EXTINCTION OFNATION-STATES: AWORLDWITHOUTBORDERS (1996);
WALTER B. WRISTON, THE TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY: How THE INFORMATION
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING OURWORLD (1992); Mark W. Jams, International
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the systems that will replace the nation-state remain far from clear.2"' Some
will see m the disintegration of received theory, flawed as it might have
been, a decline of international law into disarray 242 Given the problems
international legal theory suffered m the face of the theory of the all-
sovereign state, however, international law actually seems more firmly
fixed as law with the deconstruction of the state, 43 although some better
name might have to be agreed upon for the field.2'
Like all law, international law is more than just a conversation.24 Law
involves coercion, however undeveloped its institutional structure might
be.246 Yet, it is not coercion that makes a body of discourse into law but the
Law?, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 363 (1991); Kamshka Jayasunya, Globalization, Law,
and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory
Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 425 (1999); Karsten Nowrot, Legal
Consequences of Globalization: The Status ofNon-Governmental Organizations
under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 579 (1999); Bryan L.
Walser, Shared TechnicalDeciszonmaklngandtheDisaggregation ofSovereignty:
International Regulatory Policy, Expert Communities, and the Multinational
Pharmaceutical Industry, 72 TUL. L. REV 1597 (1998).
241 See CARTY, supra note 28; Allott, supra note 151; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Pro-
posalsfor Reforming the Adininistrative Procedure Act Globalization, Democracy
and the Furtherance ofa GlobalPublic Interest, 6 IND. 3. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 397
(1999); Benjamin R. Barber, Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and
StrongDemocracy, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 573 (1999); Dueling Globalizations: A Debate
between Thomas L. Friedman and Ignacio Ramonet, 116 FOR. POL'Y 110 (1999);
Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial
Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBALLEGAL STUD. 475 (1998); Stephen Haggard & Beth
A. Simmons, Theories ofInternationalRegimes, 41 INT'LORG.491 (1987); Miguel
de la Madrid Hurtado, Foreword: National Sovereignty and Globalization, 19
Hous. J. INT'L L. 553 (1997); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to
Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in StrengtheningNational and Global
Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423 (1998); Stephen D. Krasner,
Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,
36 INT'L ORG. 185 (1982).
242 See Johnston, supra note 151, at 3; Kenneth L. Wise, Social Science and
Global Law, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv 1355 (1981).
743 See TERRY NARDiN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 121-
33 (1983); MacLean, supra note 151.
2 On the displacement of the older term "law of nations" with the term "inter-
national law," see M.W Jams, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of
"InternationalLaw, " 78 AM. J. INT'LL. 405 (1984); see also Jams, supra note 240.
245 See WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 68, at 257-69.
246 See CARTY, supra note 28, at 28-37; Nicholas Onuf, Do Rules Say What
They Do? From Ordinary Language to International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 385
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adherence to that body as law by the community whose ideas the laws
propose to regulate.247 Onlybecause anorm is consideredto be legitimately
obligatory is the coercion attached to the norm both accepted m a society
and effective beyond the reach of the initial lawgiver.248
Nowhere is the normative power of the idea of law more clear than in
the workings of the International Court of Justice-a court before which
litigants appear voluntarily or not at all.249 To make these arrangements
more effective we must begin to redesign such institutions to make them
more responsive to our emerging global needs." Only as we begin to make
more accommodations to the realities created by science and technology
can we begin to build a world of peaceful and effective environmental
management that will begin to meet the needs of all peoples for dignity,
security, and well-being.
IV CONCLUSION
The examples described in this Article suggest that science and
technology have affected international law profoundly in several ways:
(1) Science, and more particularly technology, changes the problems
that international law must address (ends alteration);
(2) Science, and more particularly technology, changes the range of
responses available for problems confronted by international law (means
alteration); and
(3) Science and technology change the intellectual structures that make
up legal thinking in general and international law in particular, and thus, in
the end, alter the nature and functions of international law even when the
means and ends as such are not affected by scientific or technological
changes (structural alteration).
(1985).
27 See FRANCK, supra note 151, at 24, 184-90, 194.
248 See A.L. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAw 17 (1988).
249 See ICJStatute, supra note 228, at arts. 36, 37
250 See THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ATA CROSSROADS (Lori Fisler
Damrosch ed., 1987); THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986);
ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE (1991); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT
WORKS (3d ed. 1973) (1962); Abraham D. Sofaer, Adjudication in the
International Court ofJustice: Progress through Realism, 44 REC. ASS'N B. CITY
N.Y. 462 (1989); see also Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), reprinted in 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 638 (1992) (I.C.J. Apr. 14, 1992); Trask, supra note 120.
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I do not intend by this analysis to suggest that science and technology
directly control the evolution of international law. After all, the persistence
of scribal forms in international law long after printing revolutionized
national legal systems disproves any simple deterministic view of how
science and technology affects law Rather, technology forms one axis
whose mtersection with the other, political or normative axis, reshapes
everything we as international lawyers do.2s' These effects give concrete
expression to the vague notion that increasingly we live in a global
village,5 2 or, as John Rugge aptly summarized the point, "we are, for the
first time, living in a single history "213
The challenges posed by the emerging new social forms are daunting,
to say the least. Ethan Katsh, perhaps our most thoughtful commentator
regarding where the new electronic information and communications
technologies are taking us,' has expressed the problems we will face by
recounting the story of anthropologist Edward Hall. 5 It seems that Hall
came back to his hotel in Japan one evening to find someone else occupy-
ing his room. Upon inquiring at the front desk, he found that his room had
been moved without hIs knowledge or consent. Going to the new room, he
found that all of his possessions had been laid out in the new room in a
nearly identical pattern to the way he had left them in the morning, and that
the room itself strongly resembled the room from which he had been
moved. Needless to say, Hall found this very discomfiting. Later, Hall
would learn that this moving was a sign of respect-that he was "being
treated as a family member"--a relationship in which one can afford to be
'relaxed and informal and not stand on ceremony "256 What is important,
however, is that the experience-quite different from anything that he had
experienced in his own culture, was seriously disorienting. Hall realized
that he was now operating in a culture that he did not fully understand
despite the apparent familiarity of virtually every physical detail of the
environment in which that culture operated. His long-held assumptions
about the relationship between a guest and a hotel did not hold, and he no
25 See John Gerard Ruggie, InternationalResponses to Technology: Concepts
and Trends, 29 INT'L ORG. 557, 558 (1975).
2See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
253Ruggie, supra note 251, at 557
254 See KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 10; KATSH, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, supra note 16.
15 See Katsh, Computer Networks and Cyberspace, supra note 207, at 468-70
(referring to two similar stones that Hall recounts in EDWARD HALL, THE HIDDEN
DIMENSION (1969)).
16 HALL, supra note 255, at 65.
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longer knew what the rules were. As Katsh summarized it, "[w]hat was his,
what was shared, and what belonged to others were no longer as clear as
they had been.
' '2 7
The message Katsh would have us draw from this story is that as we
enter into a world of digital law, we also enter a new cultural setting m
which everything looks familiar but which none ofus can take for granted.
The boundaries between ourselves and others, between ours and theirs, no
longer hold. We must reexamine our assumptions and learn anew how to
behave appropriately and effectively If we neglect this lesson, we will
simply be left behind, like the blacksmith who, a century ago, refused to
learn auto mechanics.
17 Katsh, Law Reviews, supra note 189, at 116.
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